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ABSTRACT
Do we directly perceive physical objects? What is the significance of the 
qualification ‘directly’ here? Austin famously denied that there was a unique 
interpretation by which we could make sense of the traditional debate in the 
philosophy of perception. I look here at Thompson Clarke’s discussion of 
GE Moore and surface perception to answer Austin’s scepticism.
1. The central problem of sense perception has often been framed 
in terms of the answer to the question, ‘Do we ever directly perceive 
material objects?’ Yet, as simple as the question seems, it is unclear 
what the import of answering it one way rather than another is: 
what is the significance of drawing any distinction between directly 
and indirectly perceiving, or alternatively between direct and indi-
rect objects of perception? Notoriously, JL Austin claimed that there 
is no one distinction to be drawn by reference to ‘direct’/’indirect’ 
or ‘directly’/’indirectly’, and hence that the traditional problem of 
perception is ill-posed (Austin 1962). Austin recommended that we 
simply reject the whole debate. And when philosophical discussion 
of perception eventually became popular again, the terms in which 
issues were debated came to focus on questions about the nature of 
sense experience, on the existence or role of qualia or sensational 
properties, and the centrality of representational or intentional con-
tent. So one might think that Austin’s wishes had posthumously been 
fulfilled and the traditional debate laid to rest. Nonetheless, despite 
Austin’s scorn for the terms, there remains a tendency for some to in-
sist that what they are up to is to provide a form of direct realism in 
the theory of perception, and to look on the connotations of indirect 
realism as a demerit in an account of sense perception.1
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Here I wish to turn back to the traditional debate, and follow 
through this question of the significance of the direct versus indirect 
distinction. And my aim is to plot the connections between these 
older and unfashionable ways of framing the debate with terms that 
are more popular now. Eventually, I’ll argue that the terms of current 
debate can in fact only be understood in terms of the concerns that 
were central to the traditional debate that Austin encouraged us to 
reject.
To lay bare the connections we need to look in some detail at one 
of the more teasing, or even baffling, contributions to the debate 
about objects of perception published in the last fifty years: Thomp-
son Clarke’s ‘Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects’, a paper that 
makes up one third of his published output (Clarke 1965). Clarke’s 
discussion is focused on GE Moore’s famous account of sense-data. 
The grander themes that Clarke wishes to pull out are pursued fur-
ther in his third and final paper, ‘The Legacy of Skepticism’, which 
again engages with Moore and Austin: Clarke is concerned with the 
impossibility of epistemology, that the phenomenon we wish to study 
as philosophers is necessarily changed in our enquiry (Clarke 1972). 
But one can extract from the grander message more limited lessons 
to be learned about the form that debates over the objects of percep-
tion should take, and how these intersect with now more generally 
discussed concerns with the content of sensory experience.
I start with Moore’s most famous recipe for detecting sense-data 
before puzzling over Clarke’s reconstruction of Moore’s position. 
Clarke himself is somewhat (and somewhat deliberately) elliptical 
in the way in which he sets out the options. So before we can un-
derstand his critique of Moore we need to set the discussion in a 
wider context. I’ll do that by contrasting Clarke’s scepticism with 
Frank Jackson’s later account of the distinction (Jackson 1977). That 
will give us the materials with which to see the substance of their 
disagreement, and what Clarke’s main moral in the debate is. In the 
conclusion I’ll lay out how this dispute bears on recent discussions of 
the relation of object and content of sense experience.
2.  GE Moore sets out a signal statement of his version of the sense-
datum theory of perception in the penultimate section of ‘A Defence 
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of Common Sense’, published in 1925 (Moore 1925). The key claims 
summarized here reflect the position he’d announced in 1918, in the 
presidential address, ‘Some Judgments of Perception’, (Moore 1918), 
the paper that Clarke picks on as his main target.
Moore is keen to convince his reader that the starting point of his 
discussion is uncontentious, and that we can all be certain that there 
are sense-data, given what Moore means by the term. According to 
Moore that leaves open further unsettled questions in the area. Theo-
rists are not in a position to choose between two philosophical posi-
tions: whether we directly perceive the surfaces of objects and come 
to perceive other material objects through the part-whole relations 
these surfaces bear to them; or whether we perceive entirely distinct 
non-physical objects of perception which make available other ob-
jects through some as yet unspecified relation R to be determined. 
But Moore thinks that we get to this position of indecision from a 
common starting point which all of his readers should be able to 
occupy. So leaving aside Moore’s dilemma, and the puzzle of mak-
ing sense of the options he offers us, let us focus just on the alleged 
obviousness of the starting point:
But there is no doubt at all that there are sense-data, in the sense 
in which I am now using that term. I am at present seeing a great 
number of them, and feeling others. And in order to point out to 
the reader what sort of things I mean by sense-data, I need only ask 
him to look at his own right hand. If he does this he will be able to 
pick out something (and, unless he is seeing double, only one thing) 
with regard to which he will see that it is, at first sight, a natural 
view to take that that thing is identical, not, indeed, with his whole 
right hand, but with that part of its surface which he is actually 
seeing, but will also (on a little reflection) be able to see that it is 
doubtful whether it can be identical with the part of the surface 
of his hand in question. Things of the sort (in a certain respect) of 
which this thing is, which he sees in looking at his hand, and with 
regard to which he can understand how some philosophers should 
have supposed it to be the part of the surface of his hand which he 
is seeing, while others have supposed that it can’t be, are what I 
mean by ‘sense-data’. I therefore define the term in such a way that 
it is an open question whether the sense-datum which I now see in 
looking at my hand and which is a sense-datum of my hand is or is 
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not identical with that part of its surface which I am now actually 
seeing. ((Moore 1925), pp. 54-5.)
One striking element of Moore’s discussion is that he takes the vari-
ous claims he makes in this passage to be absolutely certain and not 
up for further debate or worry, in contrast to the unsettled questions 
which beset philosophical debate about sense perception that he is 
just about to outline. Another point to note is that as Moore uses the 
term ‘sense-datum’ here (and in fact as he originally defined it), the 
term is in effect a functional term, singling out those things which 
fulfil the role of being given to sensory awareness. There is no as-
sumption built in to the definition that sense-data are non-physical 
or immaterial, and certainly not that they should be mind-dependent.
That is, of course, not to say that the presuppositions of the defi-
nition are without question. One that will be salient to readers now 
is Moore’s assumption that there always is a suitable such object to 
play the role of being given to sensory awareness in all cases of sen-
sory awareness, actual or merely possible. The terms in which sense 
experience is commonly now debated, it is usual to grant at least the 
conceivability of sense experiences where there is no suitable exist-
ing object to be the object of perception – indeed that is how some 
writers choose to characterize the kind of perceptual hallucinations 
of most interest in debates about the causal argument. For Moore, 
either such cases are clearly not to be included among those we are 
to be interested in, or it is simply certain that an object of awareness 
exists. Now for all Moore’s confidence in his opinion here, it is ob-
scure how one should go about establishing the claim that a suitable 
object of awareness must exist in all relevant cases of sensory aware-
ness. And Moore himself ought to feel the concern acutely: since for 
him the principle in question is a certain one, any grounds offered 
for it had better themselves be certain, and any principle of inference 
relied on equally beyond challenge. It is surely as hard to conceive of 
how one might so establish the principle as to think of it as in itself 
somehow obvious and in need of no further support.
A more recondite but equally questionable presupposition here is 
that the various things which might be given to the senses have suf-
ficient in common to be grouped together as a sort of thing and have 
a label, namely ‘sense-datum’. Having observed the endless variety 
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of things a small child might ingest, including bits of fluff, chewing 
gum, small marbles, baked beans, sardines, pizza with no tomato and 
so on, one might introduce a term ‘stomachum-datum’ to cover that 
which is fitted into the child’s stomach. Given its physical dimen-
sions, there will be some similarities across the various items which 
belong to this sort reflecting physical and biological laws, but be-
yond that there really is little reason to suppose a natural kind or sort 
here for which any interesting general truths should hold. Moore’s 
enquiry into sense-data, on the other hand, does seem to presuppose 
that the range of entities picked out relationally in this way may yet 
have a common nature worth investigating.
We should also note one further aspect of Moore’s recipe which 
bears on OK Bouwsma’s notorious incomprehension of it (Bouwsma 
1942). Moore assumes that the instructions he offers are to be fol-
lowed in a distinctively first-personal way by each of his readers. An 
audience member hearing the original lecture who took it upon him-
self to march up to the lectern and insert himself between Moore’s 
nose and his right hand, the better to inspect the sense-datum Moore 
was talking about has missed the point of the passage. One can-
not follow the recipe in order to single out what occupies the role 
of sense-datum for another person. In this way, the singling out in 
question is unlike the task of identifying ingredients on the televi-
sion show Master Chef. A contestant who fails to identify the fennel 
bulb or the passion fruit on a table teeming with ingredients can 
be handed the relevant item by a production assistant. No one else 
can take on the task of singling out for one what are to count as 
Moorean sense-data. For Moore, the task of the theory of perception 
has a distinctively first-personal aspect. And what Clarke sees in his 
discussion of Moore, is that there is a switch back and forth between 
a third-personal and first-personal perspective on seeing which is es-
sential to the project as Moore conceives of it. 
But to get there we need to address explicitly one further puz-
zle about this passage. Moore takes it to be absolutely certain that 
when one looks at an opaque object such as your right hand, you 
can ‘strictly’ see only a part of its surface, if you count as strictly 
seeing an opaque physical object at all. He starts the task of singling 
out a sense-datum with the fleshy hand as target, but immediately 
moves to the hand’s facing surface. He offers no explicit argument 
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for the substitution, nor any explanation. But he writes with the as-
sumption that his readership will accept the claim as obvious and 
beyond question. However obvious this may have seemed to Moore 
at the time, and however many readers happily follow Moore in this 
assumption, the substitution is not as straightforward as Moore’s 
style would seem to indicate. What have I missed, if I cannot follow 
Moore here, and find myself stuck with the hand proper and not its 
facing surface? Is there some argument or further consideration to 
be added at this stage?
3.  Consider two opposing responses to Moore’s instructions and 
the apparent discovery of the role of surfaces. On the one hand, one 
might insist that it really makes no sense to suppose that we see only 
the surface of the hand, or only see that directly, rather than the hand 
itself. This response finds confusion in Moore’s formulation, but also 
a potential threat to our conception of our perceptual relations to 
such objects as hands or tomatoes. To say that we only indirectly or 
mediately see the hand or the tomato puts us in an inferior position 
with respect to it than simply seeing it, or seeing it directly.
Along these lines is Austin’s verdict on these matters, when he 
complains first:
We have here, in fact, a typical case of a word, which already has a 
very special use, being gradually stretched, without caution or defi-
nition or any limit, until it becomes, first perhaps obscurely meta-
phorical, but ultimately meaningless… 1. First of all, it is essential 
to realize that there the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the 
trousers – ‘directly’ takes whatever sense it has from the contrast 
with its opposite: while ‘indirectly’ itself (a) has a use only in special 
cases, and also (b) has different uses in different cases—though that 
doesn’t mean, of course, that there is not a good reason why we 
should use the same word… ((Austin 1962), p.15)
And he then goes on to sum up the discussion with the following 
verdict:
Thus, it is quite plain that the philosophers’ use of ‘directly per-
ceive’, whatever it may be, is not the ordinary, or any familiar, use; 
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for in that use it is not only false but simply absurd to say that such 
objects as pens or cigarettes are never perceived directly. ((Austin 
1962), p. 19.)
Austin’s target here is AJ Ayer rather than Moore, but the terms 
of complaint would seem to apply to each if they apply at all. The 
damning verdict is somewhat puzzling all the same. For suppose that 
Moore does need some special interpretation of ‘directly’ to make 
clear that we at best directly perceive only the facing surface of the 
hand and not the hand itself. Still, in context it is clear that Moore 
thinks such an interpretation is easily available to his readership, 
and that they will rapidly assent to his description of the situation. 
Moore needn’t deny that there are many different understandings 
to be had of how we might draw the contrast; and he needn’t deny 
that on many of those interpretations it would be foolish to deny 
that pens or cigarettes get to be directly perceived. He just needs it 
to be the case that in the context of his enquiry, one such contrast 
will become the salient one, and that with that interpretation in play, 
it turns out that we don’t directly perceive the hand, the pen, or the 
cigarette. We need some more guidance as to what must have gone 
wrong here, if we are to stick with Austin’s verdict.
The opposite reaction to Austin’s is not to find the direct–indirect 
perception contrast empty, or ill-defined, but rather to find it obvi-
ous or trivial. Some writers have supposed that the question of direct 
perception turns on our general understanding of how some predi-
cates apply to parts and to wholes. I am currently located in Berkeley, 
and in California, and in the USA. These don’t seem to be entirely 
separate matters of fact, but closely related. It is through being on 
campus in Berkeley that I count as being in California, and in turn 
count as being in the USA: my location spreads through each region 
that I count as being located in, through each of the regions in turn 
being a proper part of some larger region. And what holds for loca-
tion seems also to hold for touching something, in the sense of be-
ing in physical contact with it: imagine a quarter resting on its edge 
against the back of Moses Hall; it seems perfectly proper to say that 
it touches or is in contact with Moses Hall and also that it touches 
just the back wall, and indeed just a small region of that wall. Again 
here, it seems manifest that the coin counts as touching Moses Hall 
only because it touches the wall, and counts as touching the wall 
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because it touches some small part of the wall. We have here the in-
heritance of a relation of touching across a part–whole relation. As 
for location and touching, this response goes, so too for seeing. In 
seeing a part of some object, I thereby count as seeing the object: the 
relation of seeing comes to be inherited over the part–whole relation.
This reaction to Moore criticizes him for misclassifying the sig-
nificance of the claim that at best we see an object indirectly in virtue 
of seeing its facing surface. Seeing the surface should be taken to be 
analogous to my filling out a small volume of space in my office; 
or the small region of the edge of the coin being in contact with an 
equally small region of the back wall. In all three cases we have some 
facts about parts, and, so the interpretation goes, the facts about 
wholes are simply inherited from, or determined by, these facts con-
cerning the parts. Anyone competent with spatial part–whole dis-
tinctions should recognize as obvious that one can see a hand only 
by seeing its facing surface.2 There is no discovery to be made here in 
Moore’s enquiry, but just a commitment we can only recognize in the 
application of some of our predicates to wholes and to parts.
This might, at first sight, seem less critical than Austin’s response, 
but its consequences for Moore are far less charitable. The problem 
is not just that Moore might suppose the part–whole relation induces 
a more substantive contrast among the entities one perceives than 
he is entitled to. Moore’s considered agnosticism among theories of 
perception involves assuming that the sense-datum role might either 
be occupied by a surface of an object, or by some wholly distinct 
entity, a non-physical thing, which stands in some as yet unspecified 
relation other than the part–whole one. But it is unclear why a rela-
tion which transmits across the part–whole relation will transmit in 
similar manner between non-physical colour patch and wholly dis-
tinct material object acting as cause. Without an explanation of the 
continuity, one should be concerned that Moore is grouping cases 
together which he ought to treat as very different from each other.
2 The discussion Clarke himself focuses on which expresses this view is 
from Roderick Chisholm, (Chisholm 1957). While Chisholm does offer 
this picture of what is at issue in Moore, he doesn’t actually endorse this 
gloss on the distinction between direct and indirect since he thinks it is in 
fact false that seeing a part suffices for seeing a whole. (Thereby agreeing in 
part with Moore himself, who denied that the relation expressed by ‘see’ is 
automatically inherited over the part–whole relation.)
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Both of these negative responses to Moore are in the background 
of Thompson Clarke’s treatment of these matters in ‘Seeing Surfaces 
and Physical Objects’. Clarke rejects the supposition that all that 
there is to Moore’s position is a triviality. Clarke introduces what 
he labels the ‘HM fact’, where ‘HM’ indicates that we are concerned 
with how much of an object one sees. Clarke’s target supposedly dis-
covers that the answer to this question is that at best one sees the fac-
ing surface of any opaque object. Contrary to the second complaint, 
Clarke insists that this claim, if true, is not a triviality. With Austin, 
he supposes that we would be in a much worse position perceptually 
were we to take in, strictly speaking, only the surfaces of objects and 
not the objects themselves. And, ultimately, Clarke also agrees with 
Austin that we are not left in that position, and so he rejects the idea 
that the HM fact does obtain. But he is much more sympathetic to 
Moore than Austin is to Ayer: Clarke claims that there are strong 
grounds for supposing the HM fact to obtain, and the demonstration 
that it fails to obtain allegedly provides a surprising philosophical 
lesson.
Clarke sets out to illustrate both the manner in which we might 
be led to affirm Moore’s claim and how, if we do endorse it, we 
endorse something which cannot be trivial. For Moore’s claim com-
mits us to the view that our perceptual position with respect to a 
seen tomato is worse off than we had initially and unreflectively sup-
posed. Although Clarke gives over nearly half his paper to the initial 
two steps, he does not reconstruct them as arguments. But working 
through the details of these steps, and considering how we might 
seek to resist them will help us unpack what Clarke sees is going on 
in Moore’s discussion.
4.  Clarke starts out by noting that those who suppose that we do 
not see anything but the surface of an object usually don’t give us 
any argument for the claim; for them, it is simply an (obvious) ob-
servation. And he hints that, given this, it would be unsatisfactory 
simply to provide them with some argument for the conclusion and 
then to criticize the assumptions in play. Instead, Clarke suggests a 
recipe which seems to lead to the claim in play. First we draw a sim-
ple diagram of a tomato and someone viewing it, sideways on. And 
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then, reflecting on that person’s position we ask for any given part of 
the tomato, does X see this part? If X cannot see that part, then we 
mark it with a cross, and if X can see some part then we mark it with 
a dark line. So we start with the diagram ST (presumably so-labelled 
as ‘Seeing Tomato’) as follows:
Clarke also assumes without further argument that we will all agree 
that X cannot see the back portions of the tomato (the right-hand 
side in our diagram) but that no one will question that he can see the 
foremost parts (the left-hand side in our diagram) and so fills in the 
diagram so:
Indicating the parts of the tomato which are not seen and the thick 
line indicating the part which X sees. Note that with STm (presum-
ably for ‘Seeing Tomato marked-up’), if we grant the correctness of 
the markings of what is seen or not by X we get the result that the 
 
X 
ST 
 
X 
STm
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various parts cross-hatched are not seen. Clarke goes further in his 
claims than what is explicitly drawn into the diagram, for he draws 
the conclusion that X doesn’t just fail to see those parts of the to-
mato, he fails to see the tomato: all that X strictly speaking sees is the 
front surface of the tomato, the part marked with a dark line.
Now one might already raise a question at this stage whether 
Clarke’s diagrammatic demonstration really does show what he takes 
it to, and whether he is right to hold off attempting to provide some 
argumentative structure to this proponent’s position. For, there cer-
tainly is some promise dialectically in simply and obdurately block-
ing this first move. Clarke is clearly aware that no such principle as, 
‘One sees an object only if one sees all of its parts’, is an appropriate 
ground from which to launch the challenge. No such principle is 
self-evident nor obviously derivable from any self-evident principles. 
If it has a role in this discussion it is only as part of the conclusion, 
summarizing what we learn from the first diagram.3 Nonetheless, 
3  A more subtle fallacy is the following:
You do not see the backside of the tomato
If you do not see the backside of the tomato, then you do not see every part 
of the tomato
If you do not see every part of the tomato, then you do not see the whole 
tomato
The whole tomato is identical with the tomato
If you do not see every part of the tomato, then you do not see the tomato
You do not see the tomato
The argument certainly sounds fishy, but it is not straightforward to tie 
down exactly where it goes wrong. The most salient controversy here 
concerns (4): one might suppose that on the construal of ‘whole tomato’ 
required to validate (3), (4) should be counted false. While according to a 
pure mereology, a continuant such as a tomato may be no more than the 
sum of its parts, many suppose that there is more to an integral object than 
just that, since objects can persist through loss or substitution of parts. But 
consider 
(4*) The whole class is identical with the class
If we accept that ‘the class’ is a plural term which picks out the plurality 
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I think it would be mistaken for us to stick here with an obdurate 
rejection of the first step, and to ignore the further development of 
Clarke’s position. Clarke’s focus is on a concern with surfaces of ob-
jects and so with relations between parts and wholes (and even more 
narrowly, the relation between arbitrary parts and wholes since there 
is no unique division of the tomato or the lump of cheese into parts; 
and that aspect of the stories is certainly further exploited in Clarke’s 
later discussion of unit concepts in section three of the paper). But 
he uses this as an illustrative example to make more general claims 
in the theory of perception and knowledge. As we shall see, there are 
more general lessons to learn about the problems of perception here, 
but we can extract them only from considering what goes wrong 
with trying to block Clarke’s second move.
5.  In the second section, Clarke sets out to defend the puzzling con-
clusion of the traditional debate: that the observation from section 
one puts us in a worse position than we commonsensically suppose 
when we reflect on what we can see and what seeing does for us. As 
with section one, the point of the exercise is not to work through 
of members of the class, and allows us to speak severally or collectively of 
that plurality, then presumably we are inclined to accept this as true, what-
ever we think of (4) itself. Nonetheless we might grant
 (3*) If you do not fail every member of the class, then you do not 
fail the whole class
as true even in circumstances in which
 (5*) If you do not fail every member of the class, then you do not 
fail the class
is false – perhaps because we think avoiding failing the class requires that 
a significant proportion actually passes. So despite the equivalence in entity 
between the class and the several individuals considered together, ‘whole’ 
interacts with other elements of the sentence in a way which prevents 
substitution salva veritate; an observation which might encourage one to 
exploit an event-based ontology in one’s semantics. Note, again, that this 
is certainly not an argument that Clarke invites us to endorse, but it helps 
underline that there is something complex in our thought about parts and 
wholes beyond the concerns he raises with unit concepts and arbitrary 
parts. (Thanks in particular to Sven Rozencranz for discussion of these is-
sues.)
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some argument that the philosopher presents us with, but to see how 
he has noticed something about the situation. Again diagrams come 
to our aid. We start again with ST 
Clarke offers (a) as a modification of STm from the first diagram – 
in this case we have marked a portion which could be removed as a 
self-standing entity, as indeed is the case in example (b). The second 
piece of reasoning goes through comparing two comparisons: first 
ST with (b) and then (a) with (b). Clarke suggests that for the plain 
man it is clear that (b) involves a worse perceptual position with 
respect to the tomato than ST: if we start with ST, then what one 
sees is the tomato, but in (b) it is clear that all one can see is the right 
quarter of the tomato. So (b) puts one in a worse perceptual position 
than ST. What then of (a)? Clarke suggests that we are not inclined 
to treat (a) as plainly superior to (b) in the way that we do treat ST. 
Given this contrast between the two comparisons, Clarke concludes 
that one is worse off in (a) than in ST, although he leaves open ex-
actly how much worse off one is, and whether one is in fact in no 
better position in (a) than in (b).
As with the first step, Clarke is not really offering a set of argu-
mentative moves with underlying principles which can be articulated 
and possibly challenged. We are supposed to see the force of the phi-
losopher’s challenge in relation to the first diagram just by inspecting 
the diagram itself on the page; and consequently we are also to feel 
the force of the contrast between ST and (a) by looking at the second 
diagram. So our recognition of the force of the complaint that if our 
position is no better than in STm we must be in a worse position 
than originally we took ourselves to be in, since that was properly 
 
X 
ST 
X 
(a) 
X 
(b) 
14 MGF Martin
represented by ST, is all grounded simply in what Clarke insists his 
readers can just read off from these sketches.
Suppose one refuses to be moved by Clarke’s tone of authority. 
What position should an obdurate audience of Clarke’s second stage 
adopt? Since the second stage is conditional on the first, this audi-
ence grants him the thought that we strictly speaking only count as 
seeing the surface of the tomato. But, contrary to many of the list 
of eminent philosophers Clarke starts with, this opponent supposes 
acknowledging this is simply acknowledging something trivial, and 
known to all who are competent with the verb ‘see’.
Still saying this is not yet to say enough. Everyone grants that 
one doesn’t see the tomato in (b). If this opponent simply says that 
one doesn’t see the tomato, only its surface, and nothing more, then 
it looks as if they claim of ST that one is in just the same position 
with respect to the tomato as in (b), namely of not seeing it. This is 
a possible position to adopt, but it doesn’t make for the most inter-
esting response to Clarke.4 The more plausible opponent insists on 
a division between direct and indirect objects of sight. For such an 
opponent, talk of seeing simpliciter, ‘seeing’ without qualification, 
is a way of talking indifferently about direct or indirect seeing. On 
this view, when we say of ST that one sees the tomato, we leave open 
whether one directly or indirectly sees the tomato. What this oppo-
nent takes to be trivial is that one does not directly see the tomato; 
one only directly sees the surface. Likewise, what the opponent also 
takes to be trivial is that one does indirectly see the tomato in two of 
the scenarios. For this view, the difference between ST and (a) does 
not lie in whether one sees the tomato simpliciter, for one does – in 
both cases indirectly. In contrast to both of these situations, situation 
(b) is worse since one doesn’t see the tomato, one sees it neither di-
rectly nor indirectly. For this trivial reason (b) is worse than ST and 
4  Likewise, a possible block to Clarke here is to note that his explicit 
discussion implicitly rests on an assumption about the ranking of one’s per-
ceptual position in a situation. He reasons from the fact that one is much 
better placed in ST from (b) and only somewhat better placed in (a) from 
(b) to being better placed in ST than (a). But it would be consistent with 
the ranking of ST as much better than (b) (for example that there is some 
situation ST* which is worse than ST but better than (b)) and (a) as only 
a bit better than (b), that ST and (a) simply be incommensurable, neither 
equal with each other, nor better or worse than the other.
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equally worse than (a). For this opponent, there is no interesting dif-
ference between ST, STm and (a): in all three one only directly sees 
the surface, but one counts as indirectly seeing other relevant entities 
suitably related to that surface.
Since Clarke does not offer any explicit argument why we should 
suppose (a) puts one in a worse position in comparison with (b) than 
ST does, this opponent simply sticks to his or her guns. What they 
also insist is that Clarke is wrong to surmise that one introduces talk 
of direct or indirect seeing only in response to the problem of rescu-
ing (a) from being quite as bad as (b): that is simply to fail to see 
quite how trivial the acknowledgement of the fact is that the tomato 
can’t be directly seen.5
Note at this point there is something of a stand-off between the 
two positions. Clarke points out that there is a contrast between see-
ing a tomato and seeing just something which amounts to a separat-
ed front quarter of a tomato which occludes the separated rest of the 
tomato. The opponent agrees but insists that there is still a difference 
between seeing, albeit indirectly, the tomato, which is depicted in all 
of the diagrams apart from (b), and not seeing the tomato. 
But this opponent also thinks that there is at least a specification 
of seeing, directly seeing, which one does not stand in to the tomato, 
but at best its surface. We don’t know yet what that further specifi-
cation is, and without knowledge of that we can’t hope to establish 
whether this is a view consistent with common sense: does common 
sense suppose that we stand in that relation, the direct seeing rela-
tion, to the tomato itself? Or is it happy to grant that we do so 
just to its surface? Perhaps common sense has no settled view of the 
matter; or perhaps there can be no settled view of whether common 
sense has any view here. The obdurate opponent insists that the di-
rect–indirect distinction is trivial, and hence that it could be no part 
of common sense that we were directly related to physical objects 
as opposed to their surfaces. Clarke suggests otherwise. To settle the 
matter, we need to have a more definite sense of what it might be to 
directly or immediately see an object. Clarke doesn’t provide that. 
And, surprisingly enough, most defenders of the direct–indirect dis-
5 Clarke’s hypothesis about the genesis of direct–indirect talk does fit 
Moore’s own discussion, though, in ‘Some Judgements of Perception’ on 
which Clarke is commenting.
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tinction fail to do so too.
6.  One suggestive advance on this debate comes from Frank Jack-
son’s discussion of these matters in Perception: A Representative 
Theory (Jackson 1977). Jackson focuses on the contrast between 
what he calls ‘mediate’ and ‘immediate’ objects of vision, having used 
the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ ‘perception’ for what he takes to be 
a mistaken way of carving up the debate. Despite that, it is useful to 
apply Jackson’s definitions to the debate about direct and indirect 
seeing that Clarke is interested in. Jackson’s initial definition goes as 
follows:
…x is a mediate object of (visual) perception (for S at t) iff S sees x 
at t, and there is a y such that (x ≠ y and) S sees x in virtue of seeing 
y.   An immediate object of perception is one that is not mediate; 
and we can define the relation of immediately perceiving thus: S im-
mediately perceives x at t iff x is an immediate object of perception 
for S at t… ((Jackson 1977), pp.19-20.)
Jackson certainly belongs with Clarke’s target in his second step. 
One of Jackson’s aims in giving just this form of definition is to show 
how we can give a clear account of the contrast between immediate 
and mediate perception without having to enter into any contro-
versies over the nature of immediate perception itself. Perception is 
mediate where the fact that someone is perceiving involves the addi-
tional logical complexity (one sees o in virtue of seeing o’ and not o 
= o’). Jackson works with an understanding of immediate perception 
simply as perception which is not mediate; an immediate perception 
truth does not itself involve the additional logical complexity of me-
diate perception. The logical simplicity of immediate facts is treated 
as the ground floor, and repeated levels are introduced through the 
complexity of mediate seeing, relying on the ‘in virtue of’ relation 
holding among facts about what is seen. This provides us with a 
hierarchy of perceptual facts ordered by the ‘in virtue of’ relation.
However, Jackson’s formal definition does not by itself settle 
whether anything is seen immediately or whether anything is seen 
mediately.6 For all of its formal elegance, Jackson’s hierarchy could 
6 In context, it is clear that Jackson assumes that ‘in virtue of’ is both asym-
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lack a ground floor, or be empty above that step. That said, it is clear 
from Jackson’s discussion that he takes it to be obvious that both 
sides of the contrast between immediate and mediate perception 
have application in the world, and that we all readily recognize that 
we see some things mediately in virtue of seeing other things which 
are proper parts of the seen objects:
…the application of “I see—” to an opaque, three-dimensional ob-
ject is definable in terms of its application to a reasonably substan-
tial part, for I am properly said to see an opaque object if I see a 
reasonably substantial part of it.  ((Jackson 1977), p. 19)
Jackson is writing more than ten years after Clarke’s piece was pub-
lished. Nonetheless in this passage he seems to endorse just the move 
Clarke highlights from the start of Moore’s sense-datum enquiry. He 
seems ignorant of or unmoved by any of Clarke’s worries, so it is a 
short step to take him as occupying the oppositional position in our 
discussion above.
Indeed, Jackson’s strategy in Perception: A Representative Theory 
is to start with the notion of immediate perception as entirely primi-
tive and then to explain other notions in terms of it. Before he in-
troduces his own definition, Jackson criticizes other accounts which 
attempt to explain direct perception in terms of some of its features, 
such as how it grounds noninferential knowledge. Later in the book, 
Jackson offers an analysis of ‘phenomenal’ looks statements which 
draws on his earlier account of immediate seeing: o looks F to one 
(in a phenomenal sense) iff one immediately sees some x which is F 
and either o is identical with x or one sees o in virtue of seeing x. 
And at the end of the book, object seeing is also put to work in an 
analysis of fact perception. So, as Jackson seeks to present matters, 
nothing in our familiar repertoire of perception and appearance no-
tions could be more basic, or even as basic as, our grasp on object 
seeing. Therefore, it is not simply that we lack any further account 
of why we should accept that some objects are only mediately seen: 
Jackson denies himself any further resources to show that this is so.
metric and transitive: so it could only be the case that one sees all objects 
mediately if, whenever one sees, one sees an infinite number of objects. So it 
is not surprising that Jackson should assume that there at least some imme-
diate objects of perception. No such simple cardinality assumption explains 
why there must be mediate objects of perception.
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Jackson’s official position places him in the stand-off we identified 
at the end of the last section. For him, what Clarke is worrying about 
must be trivial: the tomato figures at best as a mediate object of sight. 
In turn, Clarke will insist that it is a demotion of the tomato to be-
ing just a mediate object of sight. However, Jackson’s definition of-
fers the resources for us to go further. Jackson’s formal definition of 
the distinction has two inter-related advantages over the way we de-
scribed the trivializing response at the outset. In Roderick Chisholm’s 
presentation of this criticism, the focus is on entailment relations 
among claims about perceiving parts and perceiving wholes, and in 
this he draws on Nelson Goodman’s two conditions of expansivity 
and dissectivity (Goodman 1977).7 In contrast, Jackson’s account in 
focusing on the more abstract notion of one fact holding in virtue 
of another is not explicitly restricted to relations among parts and 
wholes. Hence it is better suited to apply to Moore’s purposes where 
we leave open the possibility that the ultimate objects of perception 
are not parts of the ordinary objects perceived. Secondly, Jackson’s 
explication of the contrast appeals not to entailment relations among 
facts but explanatory or grounding relations: one fact about seeing 
holding in virtue of another fact. The richer context offered by the 
explanatory role of facts here can be put to work in order to justify 
the kind of hierarchy that Jackson assumes.
This is best illustrated by going back to one of Clarke’s examples 
of trivial relations among parts and wholes. Consider the relation of 
being located in a place. Parallel to Jackson’s definition of mediate 
and immediate object of sight, we can distinguish between the im-
mediate and mediate locations of material objects:
(A*)  …x is mediately located at t in region R1 iff x is located in 
region R1 at t, and there is a region R2 such that (R1 ≠ R2 and) x 
is located in R1in virtue of being located in R2.   An immediate 
location of an object is one that is not mediate; and we can define 
the relation of being immediately located in thus: x is immediately 
located in Rat t iff x is located in Rat t and R is the immediate loca-
7 Goodman defines ‘dissective’ so: ‘A one-place predicate is said to be dis-
sective if it is satisfied by every part of every individual that satisfies it.’ He 
defines ‘expansive’ correlatively so: ‘A one-place predicate is expansive if it 
is satisfied by everything that has a part satisfying it – or in other words, 
if it is satisfied by every whole consisting of anything satisfying it added to 
anything else.’ See (Goodman 1977) pp.53-54.
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tion of x… 
As with Jackson’s observations about objects of sight, one might in-
sist that typically we suppose that we are located in some regions 
in virtue of being located in other regions. I count as being located 
in California because I am located in Berkeley, and Berkeley is a 
region wholly enclosed and belonging to the larger political entity 
that is California. On this view, there are both cases of being imme-
diately located and cases of being merely mediatedly located. Given 
a small enough space and large enough objects, everything might be 
immediately located, given infinitesimal entities, everything might be 
mediatedly located. But with the space we inhabit, and the ordinary 
medium sized objects we typically encounter, we have a use for this 
contrast between the immediate location of an object and its mediate 
locations.
Here too, of course, we can imagine a kind of location sceptic 
along the lines of Austin or Chisholm about ‘see’. Such a person will 
agree that I am located in Berkeley and also agree that I am located 
in California, but they will question whether there is any further in-
teresting feature which connects these two facts. I am simply located 
(immediately) both in Berkeley and in California. But faced with 
such scepticism, it is now fairly easy to highlight various aspects of 
the position which have untoward consequences. Unlike the stand-
off we encountered above about seeing, there are clear costs to em-
bracing location scepticism. And it is these costs which explain why 
we are justified in applying the Jackson-like scheme to divide among 
different ways of being located.
Although I am located in Berkeley, my location there doesn’t ex-
clude others from this location. Were I to grow as large as Mr Stay 
Puft (and keep on growing), my being located in Berkeley would lead 
to the exclusion of all others. But as things actually are, that exclu-
sion is not a consequence of the manner in which I count as being 
located in this region of California. On the other hand, there is a 
particular volume of space on campus where I do currently exclude 
other material things from occupancy. For material objects, there are 
connotations, or consequences, which come with some ways of being 
located and which don’t carry over to other ways of being located. In 
particular, the connotation of immediate location for humans, trees 
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and medium-sized dry goods concern exclusion of other such enti-
ties from some regions but not others. To insist that there is only one 
way of being located in a region would then commit one to the idea 
that either I am not located in California, or that there is no loca-
tion such that being located in that has consequences for what I do 
or do not exclude from that area. But that is not how we treat in-
formation about location in common conversation and thought. We 
typically and fairly effortlessly keep track of whether the exclusion 
consequence is relevant or not to what has been claimed.
This offers a different perspective on Goodman’s two properties 
dissectivity and expansivity at play in Chisholm’s rejection of Moore. 
Rather than treating them as entailment properties of our applica-
tion of predicates, we might rather look to their role in characterizing 
how these kinds of connotations of a property or relation apply to 
some but not all ways of exemplifying it. For example, with Austin’s 
medium-sized dry goods, there is one way of being located which 
seems to involve the exclusion of other such entities from the region 
in which the item is located. We might suggest that we isolate im-
mediate location by reference to this connotation: x is immediately 
located in region r just in case x excludes any object entirely distinct 
from x from any sub-region of r. This, it must be confessed, is at best 
a rough approximation: a loaf of bread belongs among the relevant 
class of entities, and we would typically suppose its immediate loca-
tion to be described by the outer limits of the loaf’s crust. But it is not 
true that a loaf excludes all other material objects from that region: a 
pint of milk can be absorbed by a suitable such loaf. I’ll not pause to 
consider how we might refine the notion, though, since materiality is 
not our principal concern. If immediate location involves excluding 
other objects from a region and its sub-regions, in what other ways 
can one come to be located in a region? The most obvious thought 
here is that we use some restriction on topology as the guide to fur-
ther ways of being located. Here one might say that if one is located 
in some region r, and r is a sub-region of r’, then one counts as being 
located in r’. Again one might seek to refine this: perhaps political 
relations act as a restriction on this: The Vatican City, one might 
argue, is not in Italy although it is entirely enclosed within Italy, but 
it is in Europe. We might then suggest that those who are competent 
at understanding ways of being located in regions are inclined to 
assess whether the location in question is intended to be immediate 
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location or mediate location, and draw from that the further conse-
quences associated with these different ways of being located. But we 
might better leave open the further question whether this additional 
element of competence is a semantic competence, keying to knowl-
edge one has of the meanings of words, rather than just part of one’s 
general knowledge of how the world works which others can as-
sume one has when one competently reasons about location. In this 
story, immediate location does encode Goodmanian dissectivity. If 
there is some sub-region of r from which no part of x excludes other 
objects, then we can conclude that x is not immediately located in r. 
There will be a proper sub-region of r, r#, excluding those regions 
for which the above condition fails, which will meet the condition 
of immediate location. As we sketched the connotation of exclusion, 
a location can be immediate only if exclusion holds over all of its 
sub-regions, as one would predict if dissectivity holds. Likewise, the 
suggested gloss on the way in which location in one region grounds 
location in others itself explicitly exploits expansivity: location be-
ing inherited across the sub-region to region part–whole relation. 
Moreover, where we may suppose there are counter-examples to ex-
pansivity, such as the Vatican City in relation to Rome or Italy, we 
can understand that as a further condition on location in addition to 
expansivity.
At the same time, the example of location for material objects 
introduces two elements of competition. The idea that a material ob-
ject excludes other objects from its immediate location suggests that 
objects compete with each other for being immediately located in a 
region. That is reflected in our reasoning when we conclude from one 
object’s being in a given place, that another object cannot be located 
there. Clearly such reasoning fails in general when we are concerned 
with mediate location such as my presence in California. At the same 
time, we can think of there being a competition among regions to be 
the immediate location of an object: the connotation for being the 
immediate location of an object, given our understanding above, can 
hold for only one of the regions in which an object counts as being 
located. We have used the connotation of exclusion (and for other 
entities there will be other ways of being located, and other connota-
tions by which the hierarchy might be justified) to settle this competi-
tion among regions.
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So it cannot be that all of the locations I am in exhibit the con-
notations of exclusion: I do not exclude other objects from all of 
the regions in which I am located; and it is not true of all of these 
regions, that if I am located in that region then I am located in no 
other region. The location sceptic must either claim that these con-
notations hold for all of my locations, or that there is no particular 
association between location and the connotations. Neither of these 
options is at all attractive. And so one might seek to justify the claim 
that it is trivial that location spreads among part–whole relations by 
appeal to the obviousness of these costs.
Generalizing the proposal here, we may say that while the Jack-
son-style hierarchy is in perfectly good order even if it is taken to be 
entirely primitive, the cost of treating it simply as primitive is that 
one can offer no further justification for employing it. If we allow 
ourselves a richer bag of tools for analysis, and recognize that there 
are connotations or consequences of some, and not other, exempli-
fications of properties and relations, then we can seek to justify the 
contention that there are multiple ways of being F. We can insist that 
these ways fit into a hierarchy where some exemplifications hold in 
virtue of others; and we can explain the need for the hierarchy by ref-
erence to these further connotations (such as spatial exclusion) and 
how this richer set of facts can further specify ways in which some 
facts hold in virtue of others.
And this is the way we can move beyond the stand-off we found 
in assessing Clarke’s second step. We need to ask what connotations 
are associated distinctively with the immediate objects of sight, or 
with directly seeing, and then to ascertain whether it is obvious that 
not all objects of perception could possess the connotation in ques-
tion.8 
7.  The route to answering the first question takes us back to a point 
we mentioned about Moore’s initial enquiry: that it has a distinctive-
ly first-personal element to it. When Moore invites his audience and 
8 Note that some people insist that the verb ‘see’ is expansive even while 
being wary of the direct/indirect distinction, cf. (Snowdon 2007); as already 
noted Chisholm questions whether ‘see’ is expansive in the first place; see 
also (McLaughlin 1984).
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readers to single out their sense-data, he assumes that each will do it 
for him or herself. Moore is distinctively in a position to determine 
what the candidates for being Moore’s sense-data are: Moore knows 
something about his own sense perception which no one else is in a 
position to know, and this knowledge plays an essential role in fixing 
what could be a sense-datum for Moore. Even if Moore is uncertain 
whether it is the facing surface of the back of his hand, or some other, 
non-physical, entity which occupies the role, he is certain that the far 
side of the moon, the handkerchief in Russell’s trouser pocket, or the 
King’s undergarments cannot be playing that role. For Moore, the 
objects of perception have a distinctively subjective bearing, and it is 
this that one can pay attention to when following Moore’s instruc-
tions for singling out sense-data.
From his earliest realist writings, Moore assumes that every act of 
sensory awareness takes the form of a relation between the perceiver 
and some object of awareness, the relation of awareness itself being a 
‘colourless’ relation which adds nothing to the object of awareness.9 
In effect, Moore assumes that for a given subject all variation in acts 
of sensory awareness will be variations among the objects of aware-
ness. According to Moore, given the subject’s perspective on his or 
her sensory acts, these acts can differ from each other with respect 
only to the objects, and more importantly the qualities these objects 
appear to have, or the relations the objects appear to bear to other 
sensed objects.
Where Moore’s discussion focuses on objects and relations of 
sensory awareness, current debates about sense perception highlight 
sensory experience, and what it is like for a subject to be aware visu-
ally or tactually, or to enjoy some sense perception. This new focus 
of debate is intended to single out aspects of the mental phenomenon 
qua conscious occurrence, something with respect to which the sub-
ject’s experience may be qualitatively similar to or different from 
other conscious episodes for this subject. Now on Moore’s picture 
of sensory awareness, the relation of awareness itself contributes no 
distinctive character to any particular act of sensory awareness. This 
act will be similar or different from other acts solely in virtue of the 
9 This is one of the central claims of (Moore 1903). The theme is re-iterated 
in Moore’s later writings about sense perception, and in various of the 
remarks to be found in (Moore 1962).
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object of awareness, and the sensible qualities or relations it bears 
to other objects of awareness. For Moore, all that can contribute to 
what the experience is for a subject S, the experience’s phenomenal 
being as we might say, will be the objects of awareness and their 
sensible qualities. We can model this so: consider each judgement of 
perception which can be made solely on the basis of one’s current 
seeing: we will have a sequence of judgements, ‘That is F’, ‘That is 
G’, ‘That is H and I’, ‘That1 is R to that2’ and so on. We can think 
of these judgements as characterizing what we can call the presented 
aspect of the sense experience, and as made true by the ways the 
objects of awareness are and perhaps more narrowly are perceived 
to be. A further refinement in the case of visual experience might 
be to recognize the notion of a visual field, and so one’s sensitivity 
to the possibility of locating objects within regions of that field. In 
that case, one might think of the visual field as being characterized 
by a series of judgements about each sub-region, picking out any 
occupant, if there is one, and ascribing to it sensed qualities and 
relations to other elements of the field. Given that for Moore the 
relation of sensory awareness is colourless, any two visual experi-
ences of a given subject will be the same or different solely in virtue 
of their presented aspects: two visual experiences e1 and e2 will be 
exactly similar just in case the presented aspect of e1 is exactly similar 
to the presented aspect of e2. So in attending to the objects of sen-
sory awareness as Moore directs us to, we are, for Moore, attending 
to our sensory experience: for there is nothing more to a particular 
sensory experience, nothing more to its phenomenal being, than the 
objects of awareness, their sensible qualities, and the colourless rela-
tion of awareness. 
Given this picture of sense experience, we can identify the distinc-
tive role of the direct objects of visual perception so: they are the 
objects which fill the locations within the visual field, and which are 
the targets of the series of judgements that report what the experi-
ence is like. Moore’s commitment to the diaphaneity of sense experi-
ence means that there is no space for anything other than objects of 
awareness and their manifest qualities to contribute to the phenom-
enal being of one’s sense experience. According to this story, the one 
set of properties, phenomenal properties we might call them, that 
is ways in which sensory acts are the same or different from each 
other in respect of what-it-is-likeness, are determined by another set 
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of properties, what we called the presented aspects of those experi-
ences, i.e. the objects of awareness and their manifest qualities. 
Much of the discussion of phenomenal consciousness has been 
framed in terms of a debate about the mind−body problem. In that 
context, a concern with the ‘what-it-is-like’ of experience is com-
monly a concern with how we can explain these wondrous features 
of our waking lives in suitably physical terms. Such discussions often 
assume that we should think of phenomenal properties as monadic 
qualities of the subject, potentially to be identified with intrinsic, if 
complex, physical properties of the human animal. On such concep-
tions of the qualitative character of mind, Moore’s discussion has 
to be taken as an account of something other than qualitative expe-
rience. Moore’s discussion is strictly about relations and relational 
facts, and these couldn’t be identical with any monadic features of 
the organism. On such a view, facts concerning the ultimate objects 
of awareness and their qualities, being relational facts, contrast with 
the what-it-is-like aspects of the subject, being monadic features. So 
at best, the things that Moore is focused on, objects of awareness, 
should be understood as a ground or determiner of the experiential 
facts that we are really interested in.
But given Moore’s own viewpoint, this way of thinking of the 
qualitative character of sense experience is simply mistaken. For him, 
sensory acts are irreducibly relational; and because the relation of 
sensory awareness is constant and colourless, qualitative similarity 
and difference among sensory acts can be nothing more than what 
such awareness takes as its object. In as much as there is any qualita-
tive character to a sensory act, then that character is just the qual-
ity presented by the object of awareness. Sense experience and its 
qualitative character is primitively relational and manifestly so: the 
qualitative aspect of experience is just identified with the relational 
fact that this or that quality is present to the subject.
This raises the question in turn whether we have really identified 
an explanatory role for the direct objects of perception. What distin-
guishes the picture we have ascribed to Moore from the account we 
criticized in Jackson? Jackson takes the facts about direct (strictly 
‘immediate’ in his terms) objects of vision as primitive, and explains 
other facts in terms of them. Isn’t Moore’s insistence that there is 
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always an object of sensory awareness, and his assumption that the 
qualitative character of our experiences is nothing but the sensible 
qualities of these objects simply a different expression of the same 
idea? If so, then we will not have picked out any explanatory role 
that direct objects of perception can distinctively occupy.
To silence this objection, note that sensory acts of awareness are 
not the only occupants of the stream of consciousness. For all epi-
sodes in our waking life, one can ask the question, What is it like for 
the subject to be that way? Moore’s claims about sensory acts can 
then be thought of as an account of just one specific way of exempli-
fying consciousness, while our imagery, reminiscences, and conscious 
thoughts all offer other distinctive ways of being conscious. So un-
derstood, we have in Moore’s account the specification of subjective 
character for the sensory case but not an elimination of the notion of 
the subjective character entirely. Rather than simply taking the rela-
tion of direct perception or immediate awareness as just primitive, 
a follower of Moore can insist that this relation plays a distinctive 
role that we focus on once we ask questions about what it is like for 
us to see, to feel, to smell and so on. And so the subjective character 
of sense experience, determined in this way, can then be contrasted 
with the character of other conscious acts, where no such relation 
need play any role.10
The thought that there is no elimination to be had here is rein-
forced when we step back from Moore’s own idiosyncratic and con-
troversial commitments in the theory of sensory awareness, and con-
sider how his account of the character of sense experience is echoed 
in a very different picture of the nature of sense experience. Consider 
the following well-known discussion from PF Strawson:
Suppose a non-philosophical observer gazing idly through a win-
dow. To him we address the request, ‘Give us a description of your 
current visual experience’, or ‘How is it with you, visually, at the 
10 Whether all sense-datum theorists would exploit this response is another 
matter. HH Price, who was for a time a student of Moore, insisted that all 
mental acts differ solely in terms of their objects; see (Price 1932) p.5. Like-
wise, Bertrand Russell in The Theory of Knowledge manuscript opposes a 
content view for all mental acts (associating this position with Meinong) 
and champions what he calls a dual-relation account for imagination and 
memory no less than sensation, (Russell 1992).
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moment?’ Uncautioned as to exactly what we want, he might reply 
in some such terms as these: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun fil-
tering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; 
I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass…’ 
and so on. So we explain to him. We explain that we want him 
to amend his account so that, without any sacrifice to the fidelity 
to the experience as actually enjoyed, it nevertheless sheds all that 
heavy load of commitment to propositions about the world which 
was carried by the description he gave. We want an account which 
confines itself strictly within the limits of the subjective episode, an 
account which would remain true even if he had seen nothing of 
what he claimed to see, even if he had been subject to total illusions.
 Our observer is quick in the uptake. He does not start talk-
ing about lights and colour, patches and patterns… He says instead, 
‘I understand. I’ve got to cut out of my report all commitment to 
propositions about independently existing objects. Well the sim-
plest way to do this while remaining faithful to the character of the 
experience as actually enjoyed, it to put my previous report in in-
verted commas or oratio obliqua and describe my visual experience 
as such as it would have been natural to describe in these terms, 
had I not received the additional instruction. Thus: “I had a visual 
experience such as it would have been natural to describe by say-
ing that I saw, etc. … [or, to describe in these words, ‘I saw … etc.’] 
were it not for the obligation to exclude commitment to proposi-
tions about independently existing objects.” In this way [continues 
the observer] I use the perceptual claim – the claim it was natural to 
make in the circumstances – in order to characterise my experience, 
without actually making the claim. I render the perceptual judge-
ment internal to the characterisation of the experience without ac-
tually asserting the content of the judgement. And this is really the 
best possible way of characterising the experience … ((Strawson 
1979) pp. 43-44.)
The focus of Strawson’s discussion is a rejection of Ayer’s picture of 
perceptual knowledge: that our senses provide us with evidence on 
which we base our beliefs about the physical world, but which evi-
dence is itself entirely neutral concerning the existence of that world. 
Hence Strawson’s rejection of the idea that the subjective episode 
is to be characterized in a restricted vocabulary which mentions no 
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more than shapes, colours and so on. Whatever one makes of the dia-
lectic with Ayer, it is striking that Strawson echoes Moore’s picture of 
our knowledge of acts of sensory awareness while avoiding Moore’s 
metaphysics.
The strategy of avoidance comes in Strawson’s concern to avoid 
any ontological commitment in the observer’s description of the 
‘subjective episode’. Strawson leaves open exactly how this is effect-
ed (whether one introduces special linguistic material, some form of 
operator, which discharges ontological commitments which would 
otherwise be there; or one engages in a distinctive kind of speech act 
which removes certain of the presuppositions of one’s descriptions), 
but makes clear that the only adequate way of describing the subjec-
tive episode proper is if the description could be given even were one 
to take seriously some sceptical or nihilistic hypothesis, that one is 
enjoying the sense experience without the world being so. Moore can 
make no sense of there being sensory awareness without an object of 
awareness of which one is aware. Strawson in contrast supposes that 
we can pay attention to and reflect on our acts of sensory awareness 
even where we are agnostic concerning, or even doubt the existence 
of, any candidate objects of awareness.
Despite this fundamental contrast between Strawson and Moore, 
Strawson’s recipe for characterizing the subjective episode mirrors 
the account we have attributed to Moore: the observer’s descriptions 
of Magdalen deer park based on his current visual perception of it 
would have expressed what that observer could have known of his 
surroundings on the basis of what he could then see. This acts as the 
proper basis of his knowledge of the subjective episode only given a 
mirroring between the objects as perceived, and how they are per-
ceived to be, and what the experience is like for the subject.
While this carries over Moore’s method or epistemology for 
knowledge of what one’s sensible act is like, it does not and could 
not replicate the simple account of the nature of these phenomenal 
properties. For Moore, there is a kind of transparent constitution of 
facts about the perceiver, the what-it-is-like properties of the experi-
ence, by relational facts involving the perceiver and the objects of 
awareness. Strawson does not want to rule out that the subjective 
episode could occur in the absence of any such actual objects, and 
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hence the possibility of the episode occurring without such relational 
facts obtaining. So whatever account is offered of the subjective epi-
sode, it cannot be constituted by relational facts concerning objects 
of awareness.
Strawson does not offer any explicit account of the nature of sen-
sory awareness or sense experience; although, given his talk of mak-
ing the perceptual judgement internal to the characterisation of the 
sense experience, one might hypothesise that Strawson is attracted 
to some form of intentionalism (or representationalism) concerning 
sensory awareness, with the content of the perceptual judgement 
equating to, or mirroring, a content to be attributed to the sense ex-
perience itself. On this interpretation of Strawson, the explanation of 
the phenomenal properties of a sense experience should presumably 
be in terms of the representational properties of the sense experi-
ence, that it has such and such a content as expressed in the percep-
tual judgement, and not be given in terms of facts about the objects 
of awareness and a relation of awareness to them. So the accounts 
on offer of the nature of sense experience seem strikingly different 
between Moore and Strawson. Nonetheless, despite this difference, 
according to both, one’s route to characterizing the way the experi-
ence is goes via the knowledge that one has or could have had of the 
objects of awareness in virtue of the subjective episode.
Although the explanation of the nature of sensory awareness is 
very different between Moore and Strawson, both can agree that 
there is a central role from the subject’s perspective for the direct ob-
jects of perception: it is through our knowledge of how these are, or 
how these appear to be, that we are aware of the phenomenal being 
of the sense experience. If we reject Moore’s simple metaphysics of 
experience, then the direct objects of perception cannot play the kind 
of constitutive explanatory role that our toy example of immediate 
location suggests. But do we really need that in order to make sense 
of drawing the contrast between direct and indirect perception? If we 
adopt Strawson’s stance, it will still be the case that we can single out 
the objects by reference to which we characterize the subjective epi-
sode, and so take this as the mark of being direct objects of percep-
tion. For Moore, the relevant mark is underpinned by those objects 
making it the case that one’s sense experience is one way rather than 
another; for Strawson, it is as best as if those objects had that role.
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So endorsing a close connection between our knowledge of the 
objects of awareness and our knowledge of subjective experience is 
not tantamount to reducing facts about subjective experience simply 
to facts about the objects of awareness, and treating the relation 
of immediate seeing as primitive. Against very different background 
pictures, we can still make sense of the distinctive connotations of 
the direct objects of perception in terms of the role that our knowl-
edge of them plays in our knowledge of sense experience. We have 
application for the hierarchy, therefore, if this connotation holds for 
some but not all objects of perception.
8.  How then could we establish that only some and not all objects 
of perception should count as direct? I think that there is a seductive 
line of argument here which we can extract from consideration of 
Clarke’s second diagram, albeit a line of reasoning that we can see 
Clarke as rejecting, as I’ll come back to in the next section.
Imagine yourself into the position of Clarke’s tomato watcher: 
there is a manifold of objects in the visual scene before you, promi-
nently among which is a tomato. In virtue of your current perceptual 
situation you know about a variety of objects in the scene and know 
various things about them; you are able to single out any number of 
them and make demonstrative judgements concerning them. In the 
previous discussion, we’ve suggested that the connotation of being 
a direct or immediate object of perception goes beyond just these 
features: in addition, the direct objects have a constitutive role of fix-
ing, or anyway (for intentionalists) mark the constitutive role of that 
which fixes, the way one’s current visual experience is.
Clarke’s cases (a) and (b) can be appealed to in order to explain 
why the tomato is not directly seen in (a). Everyone would agree 
that in (b) only the separated front quarter is seen, and it occludes 
the severed tomato from sight. But the scene in (a) and in (b) from 
the tomato watcher’s perspective is just the same. So now, we might 
reason, the facing surface of the tomato is present in both (a) and (b), 
while the tomato is not part of the visual scene in (b). Since the scene 
looks the same way in both (b) and (a), and whatever is present in 
(b) is also present in (a), we may surmise that what fixes the charac-
ter of the subjective episode in both cases are the objects which are 
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common to (a) and (b), and not at all any of the objects which form 
no part of the visual scene in (b). In that case, the tomato itself fails 
the test for being a direct object of visual perception, while the front 
quarter of the tomato remains a candidate for fixing the way one’s 
experience is.
We must be careful how to understand our reasoning here. Al-
though these considerations might be appealed to in a sceptical ar-
gument intended to challenge our claim to know the presence of the 
fruit of deadly nightshade, the reasoning itself does not need to pro-
ceed by arguing about our knowledge or warrant in either case. No 
claim has been made about what we know in case (b) and how, on 
the basis of that, we don’t know certain things in case (a). Rather, we 
are to start with the thought not only that the tomato watcher can’t 
tell that there is any difference between case (b) and case (a), but also 
that this is so because the way that the scene looks remains exactly 
the same between the two cases. While things have changed quite 
radically, the tomato, or at least the majority of it, has been removed 
from the visible scene, one thing that doesn’t change is the visual 
appearance of the scene from the viewer’s perspective. So while the 
sameness of visual appearance may be appealed to in order to ex-
plain why the tomato watcher in case (b) does not know that they 
are not in case (a), that lack of knowledge of difference rests on the 
claims we are concerned with, and is not the basis for them.
Secondly, we might grant that two scenes could in some sense 
share an overall look while involving different arrangements of ob-
jects in such a way that the differences cancel out; that, after all, is 
part of the point of camouflage and invisibility cloaking. Likewise, 
even with two scenes which are composed in the same way – with 
corresponding objects in the same relative positions and with the 
same appearance – numerically distinct objects may occupy a given 
role in the two scenes: where the duck Huey may be centre stage in 
one case, his identical twin Dewey takes that role in another scene. 
So, one should be wary of making a universal claim about when 
two scenes must be the same or different in their component ele-
ments, given the sameness of their overall look. We have no reason 
to suppose that the overall look of scene decomposes uniquely. Given 
this, it is important to emphasise the more specific features which 
hold in common across cases (a) and (b) but not more generally. The 
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manifold of visible objects is arranged in the same way in both cases 
despite the disruption to the tomato. The only variation between (a) 
and (b) concerns the relative roles of the tomato and its facing sur-
face: it seems to be an open question for case (a) whether the tomato 
plays a role in the look of the scene, where it cannot be playing any 
such role in (b). On the other hand, given that the facing surface can 
play a role in case (b), then it seems to be available to play just the 
same role in case (a). Even if in other cases, distinct organization of 
the visible scene can bring about the same overall appearance, that 
would not be an appropriate description of what goes on here.
But there is a further key assumption at play in the argument, 
what we might call ‘the Slimming Assumption’. The relevance of case 
(b) is precisely to show that we can get the relevant overall look for 
the scene by appealing just to the objects which are there to be seen 
in case (b): hence the assumption is that the overall look of the scene 
in (b) is fixed by the objects which are actually seen in (b). Certainly 
this assumption, one might think, is mandated by an approach such 
as Moore’s on which the character of the sense experience is to be 
understood solely in terms of the immediate objects of awareness 
and their manifest properties. On such a view, there is no room for 
any object which isn’t seen to play any explanatory role in relation 
to the sense experience. But the assumption is not so unassailable if 
one hasn’t adopted Moore’s picture: as we saw with Strawson, the 
objects of perception should be thought to be stand ins for what re-
ally explains the character of experience, and it is conceivable that an 
object of awareness is involved in the experience from the subject’s 
perspective, even though no suitable such object exists. For Straw-
son, then, it might make sense to insist that even in case (b), the 
correct description of the experience from the subject’s perspective 
includes the tomato as such, and not merely its facing surface. Given 
his commitments, the invisibility of the tomato or even its non-exist-
ence would not decisively rule on what way the subject is experienc-
ing. But at this point, one might simply insist that merely apparent 
objects enter into the description of experience only where one is in 
some way misperceiving or misconstruing the scene before one. But 
we have been given no reason, as yet, to treat case (b) as like that, or 
anyway no reason to suppose that one must be suffering some illu-
sion in case (b). And so, one might insist, case (b) is the kind of situ-
ation in which one can see what there is to be seen manifesting the 
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way it is. Since only the facing surface, together with the surrounding 
scene, are available to be seen, it must be those objects only and how 
they appear which determines the overall look.
The above reasoning, given the soundness of the assumptions, of-
fers a compelling reason to suppose that the facing surface of the to-
mato plays the role of fixing (or is symptomatic of that which fixes) 
the overall look of the scene in case (b) and hence is in explana-
tory competition with the tomato itself in case (a). But by itself that 
doesn’t settle whether the facing surface wins the competition in case 
(a). It is open to someone to insist that the tomato pre-empts the 
facing surface in determining the look of the scene in case (a). Or 
one might claim that the tomato and facing surface together jointly 
determine the look of the scene in case (a), even though the facing 
surface suffices for this on its own in case (b). If we accept that there 
are ever cases of pre-emption or over-determination either in the 
causal or non-causal realm, then we cannot simply offer a blanket 
rejection of these possibilities. At the same time, the insistence that 
the tomato pre-empts or co-operates with the surface in fixing the 
very same look, once we have granted the explanatory adequacy of 
the surface on its own seems methodologically objectionable. While 
the argument in play here is not deductively valid, one may still insist 
that it is decisive.11
11 I relegate to a footnote a question of comparison. In his ‘How to Inter-
pret “Direct Perception”‘, PF Snowdon offers an account of direct perceiv-
ing, or d-perceiving, as he dubs it, which focuses on the connection between 
direct perception and demonstrative judgement:
x d-perceives y iff x stands, in virtue of x’s perceptual experience, in 
such a relation to y that, if x could make demonstrative judgements, 
then it would be possible for x to make the true demonstrative judge-
ment ‘That is y’. ((Snowdon 1992) p.56)
Snowdon does not offer this exactly as an analysis of direct perception 
(he does not assume that the notion of demonstrative judgement is more 
primitive than that of sense perception itself) but rather as a criterion for 
determining which objects are directly perceived. So it is possible that the 
connotations associated here with direct or immediate perception would 
coincide with Snowdon’s account.
 But there are problems with Snowdon’s proposal: as he is well 
aware, there are seeming examples of demonstrative judgements in exam-
ples which are nonetheless intuitively not cases of direct perception. Spying 
34 MGF Martin
This line of reasoning provides what we found lacking in Clarke’s 
first step: an argument to the effect that the surface plays a role which 
the tomato does not in our visual perception. But left there, the con-
clusion would be entirely consistent with Clarke’s second step, that 
what we have learned is that our perceptual situation is far worse 
than we originally envisaged it. For surely, before we engaged in the 
argument, we accepted that we did see the tomato. And the argument 
we have just been through is consistent with drawing the conclusion 
that after all the tomato was never seen, only its facing surface.
what looks to you to be Tom Cruise in mid distance, you might judge, 
‘That man is one unpopular celebrity!’ As it turns out, you have pointed in 
the direction not of Cruise himself, holed up as he is in LA, but a life-size 
cut-out image of him carried by a fan. Many will come to the verdict in this 
situation that you have both made a demonstrative judgement about Tom 
Cruise and yet are not in a position to see him. So we have demonstrative 
judgement without direct perception.
 Anticipating such worries, Snowdon attempts to define a contrast 
between derivative and non-derivative demonstration: he suggests that 
one can demonstrate someone via an image of that person only deriva-
tively, and that involves knowing that one confronts an image, and singles 
Cruise out only as the object represented by that image. In the kind of case 
sketched here, Snowdon seems committed to claiming that one succeeds 
only in demonstrating the cut-out, and that one makes the strange mistake 
of confusing a piece of cardboard for a Hollywood celebrity.
 This verdict is surely driven only by Snowdon’s account of direct 
perception. No doubt our judge has made a mistake: at the very least they 
are mistaken about how things stand in relation to Cruise, they are not in 
his presence, merely related through an image. But that doesn’t support the 
verdict that they cannot single Cruise out, or that it is unclear who they 
would be picking on.
 Moreover, we might rather demand that there should be some ex-
planatory connection between direct perception and demonstrative judge-
ment: what explains why one can single out one object rather than another 
is precisely that one can perceive it. This explanatory connection allows 
for the possibility that other relations to an object, such as one provided 
through images or other reproductions, allow for demonstration too.
 Note that there is no temptation to suppose that Cruise, as op-
posed to the cardboard print of his visage gets to fix the way our subject’s 
experience is. So to the extent that the two accounts coincide, we might 
suggest this is because we are inclined to take direct or immediate aware-
ness to be explanatory of, and so sufficient for, demonstrative judgement. 
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But the reasoning does not mandate that pessimistic conclusion. 
Here we can follow the lead set by Moore himself where he takes 
it as absolutely certain that we perceive such entities as ink stands, 
sofas, hands, and trees. Moore takes it as obvious, and hence as true, 
that we can make what he calls judgements of perception about such 
things as ink stands and hands which we are currently perceiving: 
‘That is an inkstand’, ‘This is a tomato’. One is in a position to make 
these judgements only in as much as one is perceiving them: as in-
tended, it would be odd to announce, ‘That is a whiteboard marker’ 
in relation to the sole such writing implement in the office next door, 
when one could not see, feel or hear it. In the terms we have intro-
duced from our discussion of location, we can put the point in terms 
of the presence of some of the common connotations of perception 
which weigh against the absence of the distinctive marks of immedi-
ate perception. Even though the tomato does not play a role of fixing 
the look of the scene (granting the above reasoning), still it is among 
the objects which one can single out in perceptual judgement, and 
about which one comes to be informed by the operation of one’s 
senses.
So now we have our parallel to the case of spatial location. Al-
though I am located in many regions, we take one of those regions 
to be privileged and with respect to which certain connotations hold. 
As a material being, my immediate location in a volume of space in 
Moses Hall excludes other material things from that region. I relate 
to other locations which I have in a different way. We have now 
seen reasons to think of seeing along the same lines. Certain objects 
among those that I now see fill up the visual field for me and fix the 
way that the visible scene looks. But there are other objects which I 
also currently see, and with respect to which I can make judgements 
of perception, but which are not playing that distinctive role, they do 
not help constitute the visible scene.
And with this thought in mind, we can now properly articulate 
the riposte back to Clarke concerning his second step. The three cas-
es ST, (a) and (b) all have one thing in common, which is obvious to 
us all reflecting on the tomato watcher’s perspective on the scene: in 
each case, the facing surface of the tomato is seen, and in determin-
ing a key part of the overall look of the scene each time, counts as 
immediately seen. What is striking about (b) is that in that situation, 
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the judgement of perception, ‘That is a tomato’ is false, even though 
the tomato watcher is not in a position to recognize this fact. So in 
(b), but not in (a) or ST, the tomato is not seen. From this perspective 
on the set up, there is a striking difference between (b) and the other 
two situations which can be put indifferently in terms of seeing or 
indirect seeing; and there is no discernible contrast between ST and 
(a), except in what we have highlighted in (a) about the contrasts 
between direct and indirect seeing, which is left inexplicit in the dia-
gram of ST.
9.  In my original sketch of Clarke’s paper, I noted that Clarke avoids 
giving any argument for either his first or second step; and that this 
leaves us without grounds for adjudicating between his position and 
that of someone who takes the first step to be entirely a trivial move. 
Over the last few pages, we’ve seen at least one way of justifying 
the application of a contrast between direct and indirect perception. 
This is not to say that it is the only way of justifying drawing such a 
distinction, but it has the advantage that it dovetails with the starting 
point of Moore’s sense-datum enquiry, inviting each reader to engage 
in a certain reflective enterprise. So it is also likely to engage with the 
target that Clarke intends. And so we’ve seen how such a position 
might both reason for the first step and in the light of that reasoning 
resist the second. Does this settle matters against Clarke?
The first point to note, I think, is that it should make no difference 
to Clarke if we shift the debate to one solely about direct or imme-
diate perception as defined above, and leave aside entirely indirect 
perception. So the purported HM fact can be read as the claim that 
we only ever directly see the facing surfaces of tomatoes and not the 
tomatoes themselves. And Clarke’s claim that this is not trivial if 
true, should be read as ascribing to our ordinary commitments the 
belief that tomatoes are among the things directly or immediately 
seen, rather than just their surfaces.
But, more significantly, we should note not only that Clarke 
doesn’t actually give the explanatory competition reasoning we ex-
plored above, but that he would reject it. The rejection is not for the 
superficial reason that he seeks to establish the two steps solely by 
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having his readers think about the diagrams and follow his instruc-
tions while avoiding any reasoning with premisses or principles of 
reasoning that might be challenged. While that is right, there is more 
substantive grounds of reservation for Clarke, and that will help us 
bring out his grounds for insisting on the second step.
Although we have made liberal use of talk of visual experience 
in setting up the case for the direct–indirect distinction, Clarke him-
self doesn’t make use of such vocabulary. Clarke restricts himself 
to talk in terms of ‘see’, ‘perception’, and the ‘perceptual position’ 
that an observer finds him or herself in. This echoes to some extent 
something we’ve noted about Moore too, that he expresses his posi-
tion entirely in terms of relational notions such as ‘see’ or ‘is aware 
of’. But rather than taking Clarke simply not to be interested in the 
question of visual experience, or even to be sceptical of the notion, it 
is better here to see him as adopting a shallow approach to the no-
tion: all that the common man who is invited to engage in Moore’s 
enquiry can do is to specify the facts in question in terms of what he 
knows about the objects he currently perceives. Compare here again 
the passage we cited earlier from Strawson: Strawson’s common man 
gives a report of his experience by using over again descriptions he 
would be prompted to give of what he can see.
Suppose, on the one hand, that properly engaging in the Strawso-
nian exercise of enumerating the objects currently visually to hand 
leads one simply to list the various facing surfaces (and transparent or 
translucent bulgy objects around) before one. If one recognizes that 
this set of descriptions is entirely adequate to the task that Strawson 
set, then one also knows that one has managed to describe the visual 
experience without having had to mention the tomato, one’s hand, 
or any other substantial and opaque object. So one already knows, 
in giving this description, that the first step is indeed correct. There 
is no further call to appeal to the explanatory competition reasoning 
to get to the desired conclusion. The argumentative moves we have 
spelled out above turn out to be curiously redundant. (And what 
this would also reflect is that Strawson would have been mistaken in 
his strategy for undermining Ayer’s epistemology. Ayer’s description 
of experience in terms of colour patches is simply neutral between 
the mere surfaces of objects and something non-physical or mental. 
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Strawson needs the description to be a description of the robustly 
three-dimensional world to make manifest that Ayer’s description is 
too thin.)
So, on the contrary, suppose that the argument is informative. 
One way that this may turn out to be the case follows the thread of 
Moore’s original discussion: one starts out describing the scene in 
terms of the hand, the tomato, or the inkstand, but now the explana-
tory competition argument reveals that this is a mis-description of 
the situation: it includes too much, and one should retrench just to 
the description of façades. If we stick just with this description of the 
dialectic, then we already have enough to vindicate Clarke. Clarke 
has surely already established his second step: if the competition rea-
soning is needed for this reason, then the conclusion is revisionary 
of our initial opinion about the situation, and to that extent is not 
trivial. 
But a much more interesting moral can be extracted once we 
raise questions about the grounds of this opinion, and not merely 
ask whether we have revised it. What is it about the situation which 
could have grounded the opinion in the first place? The most obvi-
ous answer is this: We start with the opinion that we directly see 
the tomato because that is how the situation seems to us. But the 
competition reasoning is intended to tell us something about how 
things seem to us, at least in the sense of our sense experience of the 
situation. So we can happily endorse the conclusion of the reasoning 
only if it revises our grounds for the original opinion; it must some-
how correct our impressions about the visual situation. Once we put 
the transition in these terms, the reasoning itself becomes unstable. 
For the argument turns on the assumption not merely that we do not 
notice any difference between the initial situation and (b), but that 
appearances are just the same across the two situations. Yet, if in one 
it seems to us as if the tomato is a certain way – bulgy, over-watered 
but bright red, say – in the other, it is merely that the façade of a to-
mato is presented in a corresponding way. And a natural way to gloss 
this contrast is that these two descriptions of how things seem reflect 
a difference between the two situations, namely in what appears to 
us. But once we admit that there is any difference in the phenomena 
to be explained, namely the way that the scene as a whole looks to 
us, then the explanatory competition argument fails. For what is to 
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be explained in (a) and (b) turns out to be different, so for all that we 
have so far shown, the tomato plays the key role in (a), while nothing 
but the surface plays a role in (b). So, the argument in being informa-
tive seems to be self-undermining, highlighting to us a non-obvious 
way in which the appearances alter between the two situations.
We seem to be able to rely on the reasoning only if it is redundant 
and we can already read off from the situation in ST or (a) that all 
that is directly perceived is the surface. If we need the reasoning to 
inform us that it is the only surface that is directly seen, then the 
reasoning shifts the description we can give of the experience, and 
thereby contradicts the assumption that there has been no change in 
the scene as visually presented.
The argument will seem informative to us only if we take our-
selves to be ignorant of the relevant character of the visual situation: 
that we know that the two scenes, whatever they contain, are the 
same, without knowing what that way is; hence we end up reading 
off from (b) what must also be manifest in (a). However, while it 
makes sense to think of ourselves as ignorant in this way were we 
thinking of matters purely third-personally, it becomes problematic 
once we take into account that we also have to imagine ourselves 
into the position of the tomato observer. For the relevant fact about 
the tomato observer is to be expressed in terms of what he or she 
directly sees, or takes him or herself directly to see. And, as Moore’s 
instruction brings out, the initial such description is in terms of the 
hand or the tomato, not just the facing surfaces.
Of course there are situations in which someone sees something 
but is ignorant of its identity. In a series of engaging puzzles, Roy So-
rensen has raised the question which of two heavenly bodies we see 
in a case of intersecting eclipses.12 Whatever is the right thing to say 
in this situation, it should be clear that it is not immediately obvious 
12 See (Sorensen 1999) and (Sorensen 2008). Sorensen, like Jackson, as-
sumes that we see objects through seeing their surfaces (although in the 
case of shadowed objects, the surface is the further and not facing surface). 
Although he exploits explanatory competition considerations, Sorensen 
does not appeal to the conditions we highlighted above concerning their 
role in experience. Rather, Sorensen appeals to a simple causal theory of 
perception, and appeals to considerations of causal competition among 
parts of objects.
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or manifest whether the nearer or further heavenly body between 
the observer and the sun is the object of awareness and a target of 
sensory attention. In more mundane terms, one of the popular top-
ics of debate at the time Clarke first presented his paper was the 
problem of perceptual identification, agonizing over how we are to 
understand the claim, for example, that the spot on the horizon is an 
important Norman church. So one might complain that the objec-
tion so far unwarrantedly assumes that we can identify the direct 
objects of sight independently of the reasoning.
But Clarke doesn’t need to make the universal claim that we can 
always identify what we see. All that he needs is that we can identify 
some of the relevant objects of sight in certain central cases (and ap-
propriate evidence is provided already in Moore’s discussion), while 
the result of the sense-datum enquiry is that our initial identifica-
tion should be withdrawn. Quite consistently with this, Clarke can 
acknowledge that there are other cases in which we simply can’t 
identify the objects of sight, but might need additional information 
through testimony or reasoning. His puzzle will remain as long as 
there are central cases which aren’t like this.
At this point, an opponent might go further and insist that one 
simply can’t know from reflection on the situation what objects one 
is currently seeing. A whole host of writers have claimed that when it 
comes to sense experience and what we can introspect, the objects of 
perception drop out of the picture: at best we are aware of the fact 
that something is thus and so, or that there is a sensible profile of 
certain qualities in the environment, but not any objects which might 
be the bearers of those qualities.13 If this were the correct descrip-
tion of the tomato observer’s perspective on the situation, then there 
would be nothing introspectively which would support the opinion 
that tomatoes rather than their surfaces counted as the direct object 
of awareness.
However, this move too undermines the reasoning we rehearsed 
in the last section. If the character of experience is conceived in pure-
13 See, for example, (McGinn 1982), (Davies 1992) and more recently 
(Schellenberg 2010) and (Montague 2011). In a more restricted vein, Mark 
Johnston claims that the character of hallucinatory experiences can be un-
derstood in terms of a sensible profile without reference to any entity which 
instantiates the universals that make up the profile, see (Johnston 2004).
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ly existential terms, or the equivalent, then we thereby undermine 
the presumption that there should be competition between different 
objects to make this the case. Looking to the case of truth-making 
or grounding, there are familiar examples in which disjunctive facts 
hold in virtue of either or both of the disjuncts, and likewise exis-
tential facts hold in virtue of indefinitely many of their instances. 
Were the phenomenal character of visual experience correctly char-
acterized as no more than that something or other presented colours 
and shape in a certain region, then this could be witnessed in one 
situation by the surface and in another by both the surface and the 
tomato, without there being any sense of superfluity. We only get a 
constraint of competition where we have the sense that there is a role 
which can be fulfilled uniquely. And that condition can’t be under-
written if we remove the individual objects of perception from sense 
experience.
Regardless of that dialectical point, it is clear that Clarke would 
treat this objection on the same level as the supposition that we mere-
ly see, or only directly see, the surfaces of opaque objects. He would 
not resist the claim that on some occasions, when suitably primed, 
this might be the correct description of our sense experience. But he 
would insist that this claim, if true, is not a trivial truth, but revises 
our thought about sight and visual experience. And again, the main 
ground of his challenge here is really a certain superficiality about the 
notion of visual experience itself: we have no route to introducing an 
audience to the idea of this other than by drawing their attention to 
some of the objects that they see. If our further philosophical reflec-
tions on the situation lead to a revision in the description, prima facie 
that leads to revision of what we were talking about.
This sets up Clarke’s original problematic and the stage for his 
would be solution. What makes the case of seeing peculiarly prob-
lematic is that what is seen seems, in some circumstances at least, 
immediately accessible to the person doing the seeing. So there 
shouldn’t be room for the kind of systematic surprise that Moore’s 
sense-datum enquiry promises. Unlike Austin, Clarke doesn’t want 
to reject the enquiry just out of hand: we need to understand how 
Moore can be driven to the claims that he makes. If Moore’s claim 
that we can only strictly see the surface (if we see any environmental 
object) were correct, then the initial starting point would make no 
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sense. But likewise, if it remains stubbornly obvious that it is only 
hands and tomatoes and not their surfaces which present themselves 
in the enquiry, then we can make little sense of how Moore overlooks 
that. So Clarke’s fundamental problematic is to diagnose how there 
can be such rational dispute about what should be just obvious to us.
And the clue to his solution is given in an elusive passage right 
towards the end of the paper when he claims:
…when we are meaning what we are saying, we find that for what 
we are asserting to be true, it is necessary for our seeing to embrace, 
as it were, this portion of the surface and only this portion. When 
we cease singling out this portion, the physical object coalesces 
back into a unit, and we are seemingly in a different perceptual 
position, for now our seeing seems to embrace the physical object 
itself; the near portion of the surface is now not embraced per se 
but is included in an object which is embraced per se. [Footnote: It 
would be desirable, of course, to express these facts less metaphori-
cally but I shall not attempt to do so here.] ((Clarke 1965) p.113)
Clarke’s thought here is that in the case of sense perception, and in 
contrast to such cases as being located in a region or in physical con-
tact with an object, the very terms in which we describe the situation 
can make a difference to the situation being described. We have no 
more fundamental way of picking out the perceptual situation than 
to enumerate which things we see. If, for reasons to be addressed in 
a moment, we find ourselves revising the terms for what counts as 
being the object of sight, then this will shift the facts about how we 
experience, and not just the terms in which we describe things. And 
the mechanism that Clarke offers us to explain how this can come 
about is his notion of a ‘unit concept’. So we move from looking at 
tomatoes to nibbling at cheese.
 
10.  To make his point, Clarke starts with a case which he himself 
labels ‘trivial’, a contrast between nibbling up cheese and nibbling at 
cheese. The former way of talking, Clarke in effect stipulates, tracks 
the absolute amount that someone has eaten. The latter, on the other 
hand, seems to be sensitive to certain contextual cues. Suppose for 
example, having bought yourself a wedge of fine Salers which you 
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have stored in the kitchen, you return home to discover tell-tale teeth 
marks at the apex of the slice. You single out your roommate for 
abuse. How might you complain? Well you may simply say, ‘You’ve 
nibbled at the wedge of Salers!’ But equally, your roommate might 
seek mitigation by insisting that, strictly speaking, they have only 
nibbled at the front half of the wedge, and left the rest untouched.
Once we go down this route, it is easy to see how someone casu-
istically might further buttress the roommate’s lack of mortal sin by 
pointing out that strictly speaking, they have only nibbled at the top 
front quarter of the cheese, and left the rest untouched. After all, 
because a good Cantal is rather continuous in material form, its divi-
sion into parts seems entirely arbitrary. But once we have divided it 
by some such scheme, then we can restrict what has been nibbled at 
to some such part and not to others.
In the light of this example, Clarke introduces the idea of what he 
calls ‘a unit concept’. This is defined so:
(A) The expression ‘nibbled at’ is true of A only when A is a unit. 
But it is an essential part of A’s being a unit that no amounts of 
A are fixed as relevant units. Hence when ‘nibbled at’ is true of A 
there is no such thing as an amount of A nibbled at.
(B) There is an amount of A nibbled at only when sub-portions of 
A are units. What amount has been nibbled at depends not only on 
physical conditions but also on which sub-portions are units. Thus 
in circumstances in which there is such a thing as an amount of A 
nibbled at, A is not a unit but a compound of units, and hence ‘nib-
bled at’ is neither true nor false of A itself.
I shall call any concept which has these properties a unit concept. 
((Clarke 1965) 109-110.)
Note that here Clarke isn’t really concerned with giving us a formal 
semantics for ‘nibbled at’ rather than ‘nibbled up’: he doesn’t specify 
how the shift in unit comes about, whether there is an element sim-
ply in the statement that the roommate has nibbled at the front half 
of the cheese, or whether it is borne in the question initially raised 
about how much has been nibbled at. He doesn’t discuss whether 
we should think of this as primarily a matter of conversational ne-
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gotiation, an element of pragmatics, rather than strictly speaking an 
element of the meaning of the words. Equally importantly, he is not 
engaging in debate with those, inspired by the kind of example we 
looked at earlier of location or contact touch, who seek to explain 
the situation in terms of a hierarchy of nibblings: immediate nibbling 
at coinciding with nibbling up, and more mediate nibblings at deriv-
ing from part–whole relations between what has been nibbled up 
and what has been left behind.
Part of Clarke’s point is that in the case of ‘nibbling at’, the rel-
evant occasion sensitivity is entirely trivial. At first sight, it might 
appear that the cheese lover’s complaint that the piece of Salers has 
been nibbled at is contradicted by the roommate’s riposte that they 
have nibbled at only the front half. But despite the appearance of 
disagreement here, both reports can correctly represent the very 
same physical state of affairs. As Clarke himself insists, there need be 
no physical difference between situations in which different units of 
cheese are in play (109).
Matters become interesting only when we apply this to the case 
of ‘see’ and visual perception. In the case of ‘nibbling at’ shifting 
the unit to which the verb phrase applies does not alter the circum-
stances that we describe. But Clarke’s solution to what he takes to 
be paradoxical in Moore’s enquiry requires that the same not be true 
for examples like the verb ‘see’. And the key difference here is that 
there is a first-personal aspect to the employment of the perception 
verbs, for which there is no obvious parallel with action verbs such 
as ‘nibble at’. The observer can only report his or her take on the 
perceptual position using the relevant perceptual verbs in question. 
So, Clarke suggests, once we shift what counts as the object of sight, 
simply by, for example, shifting in context what should count as the 
unit for sight, then we will shift what can correctly be reported as 
one’s perceptual position. In this case, we’ve shifted the terms with 
which we can describe the situation. But according to Clarke, we 
must have done more too: the physical facts need not have changed, 
but some of the facts must have changed, namely those which get 
reported from the first person perspective when one reports on what 
one can see strictly speaking, what one can directly see, or what one’s 
experience is like.
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Note that Clarke’s point is not that the verb ‘see’ is somehow 
context sensitive or polysemous. No doubt that is true. But it is also 
true of many verbs which get employed in contexts that Clarke will 
label trivial. One might both affirm that ‘see’ is context sensitive in 
its application, and yet suppose that the relevant psychological facts 
reported on using the verb remain constant across different interpre-
tations of the verb. This would be parallel to certain contextualist 
understandings of knowledge ascriptions, which take the constant 
psychological facts to concern belief and evidence, but allow that 
knowledge ascriptions are sensitive to standards of evidence, perhaps 
modulated by practical concerns.14
Clarke’s initial endorsement of the second step, and his underlin-
ing of what he sees as paradoxical in Moore’s sense-datum enquiry 
amounts to the rejection of this picture. There is no more basic de-
scription to be given of our visual experience for Clarke other than in 
terms of what we see. If you shift the interpretation of the verb ‘see’, 
Clarke will insist, then you end up shifting the facts to be reported 
on about what visual experience we have. Clarke’s metaphor of the 
surface standing out from or coalescing into the tomato highlights 
the way in which the experiential facts are, as far as he is concerned, 
not determinate independent of our choice of selecting what counts 
as the object of sight.
In this way, Clarke resolves his initial puzzle of how there can 
be a debate about the obvious facts of visual perception by offering 
us a conceptual mechanism by which mere philosophical reflection 
on the matter is bound to lead to a change in the very thing we are 
investigating. While one worries how much of the tomato one sees, 
one makes it the case that one sees only the facing surface, and that 
becomes the correct description of one’s visual experience. When one 
leaves aside the question, the extension of ‘see’ shifts and that no 
longer stands as the appropriate description of the situation. Given 
that, it cannot be true to claim simpliciter that we see only the sur-
faces of opaque objects, or even that we only directly or immediately 
perceive these surfaces. For that comes to be true only in the circum-
stances in which we suitably restrict the application of ‘see’ to make 
14 Ram Neta interprets Clarke as offering some such contextualist solu-
tion, see (Neta 2007). Note that the common understanding of contextual-
ism about knowledge ascriptions is precisely one of the targets in (Clarke 
1972).
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it true. So the HM fact is no fact, it purports to a generality which 
the evidence cannot support.
11.  Clarke’s suggestion about how our concept of ‘see’ works, 
and how that brings about a change in the psychological facts when 
we follow Moore’s recipe, the facts about what we see or what we 
experience, certainly provides a response to his original puzzle. 
Moore’s reflections over the objects of perception make it the case 
that there is no more to be seen than the surfaces of objects. While 
this does conflict with how ordinarily we think about how we are 
related to the objects we see around us, it doesn’t issue in any gen-
eral sceptical consequence. Moore has not made any general discov-
ery here about the nature of perception or perceptual experience on 
Clarke’s picture of things; he has simply found a way of making our 
perceptions or experience be one way rather than another. It would 
be wrong to generalize from Moore’s position and to claim that for 
everyone it is true that one only directly or immediately is aware (at 
best) of the surfaces. Although for each one could make that true by 
pressing the how much question, without that matter being raised 
we have no reason to question that people simply see the objects that 
they take themselves to see.
But Clarke’s account seems to render the facts of experience in-
determinate. At least since the early Gestalt work at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, it has been clear that our sense experience 
can change quite radically depending on the organization we find 
in a scene; and with some displays, it is possible for a subject to flip 
between incompatible interpretations at will. Now we see the Rubin 
vase as two faces in profile, now we see it as a table ornament. At-
tentional set, manipulation of the task, anticipation or other psycho-
logical precursors may also lead to differences in percept. Clarke’s 
discussion concerns our understanding of sense experience in a way 
that goes beyond any of these effects, however ultimately they are to 
be explained. On Clarke’s account, it is solely how one commits to 
understanding the application of the concept of see in the circum-
stances which shifts the object of sight, and so how one can describe 
the situation from the observer’s perspective, as to whether it is the 
tomato or merely its facing surface which is seen. This alteration 
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can happen consequent on, and independently of any of the familiar 
mechanisms for altering our experience of the world top down. On 
Clarke’s picture, the terms in which we have to describe the ordinary 
psychology of sight and its objects is underdetermined by the facts 
we are answerable to. In ‘trivial’ cases such as nibbling, such under-
determination of description makes for no difference in what is de-
scribed, but that cannot be the case for seeing. Our visual experience 
has a kind of fluidity to it. The terms in which we describe it, singling 
out the objects of sight, make for a difference in the experience; yet 
the choice of terms, Clarke seems to suggest, is not settled just by the 
way experience is independently of our choice of terms.
While Clarke himself seems unperturbed by this element of inde-
terminacy in his story, it may be difficult for readers more generally 
to accept the proposal. Of course, the idea that aspects of the mind 
are indeterminate has not been without champions. For example, in 
response to WV Quine’s sceptical challenge about meaning, (Quine 
1960), Donald Davidson proposed we think of the meanings of sen-
tences and the objects of belief as raising a certain indeterminacy: 
one counts as saying what an inscription or utterance says, or one 
believes what is said by it, where a suitable relation of samesaying 
holds between an interpreter’s utterance or inscription and the say-
ing of the subject interpreted (or the correlate of such utterance in a 
case of unvocalized belief) (see various of the papers collected in (Da-
vidson 1985)). For Davidson there is no privileged samesaying rela-
tion, so ‘say’ shifts the relation it picks out among subjects and utter-
ances context to context. The underlying physical and behavioural 
facts remain the same across the choices of samesaying relation, but 
meaning facts can only be specified by an appropriate interpretation. 
So necessarily there is more apparent determinacy in our attributions 
of meaning than the underlying facts can support.
Davidson’s insistence on the indeterminacy of meaning is less 
popular now than it once was, but I suspect that even those who 
reject it find the proposal that what we mean or what we think is in-
determinate less implausible than that how we experience the world 
is indeterminate. Davidson rejected talk of the subjective point of 
view, or of thoughts being before the mind. For him the question 
of indeterminacy arose in relation to a problem that is raised solely 
from a third person perspective and the task of making sense of oth-
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ers, and it is allegedly forced on us when we face up to the fact 
that the evidence which constrains our choice of interpretation, and 
which thereby provides empirical content for the sense we make of 
each other, does not single out a unique interpretation we should 
make of someone. He would think it mistaken that there is any sub-
stantive first person constraint on interpretation, that the interpreter 
needs to get right the subject’s perspective on what they think or say. 
(This is not, however, to deny that we interpret speakers as knowing 
what they say, and knowing what they think; but, as Davidson him-
self stressed, when we shift the meanings we assign to utterances or 
beliefs, we shift what we assign as what the speaker believes about 
what he or she means, and what he or she believes.)15
In contrast, Clarke’s concern has a distinctively first personal as-
pect to it. It is precisely because we must capture the subject’s own 
take on his or her experience, and so what he or she knows in see-
ing one object rather than another, that makes the puzzle about ‘see’ 
non-trivial in the first place. In as much as our understanding of the 
facts exploits the subject’s own perspective of the matter, in think-
ing about ST, (a) and (b) we flip between a third personal take on 
what is there to be seen and the subject’s take on this. So it is not as 
if we can catch the indeterminacy of experience in our grasp, so to 
speak. And it is for this reason that while Clarke talks mysteriously 
and poetically of our perceptions embracing different elements of the 
tomato, and the tomato separating into surface and rest or coalesc-
ing back into a unit, he insists that such talk is metaphorical. The 
indeterminacy here, if such there is, is reflected solely in the fact that 
we are to recognize that in one sense there need be no change in the 
situation between ST and STm or (a). But at the same time, things are 
wholly different perceptually, since in the former the tomato watcher 
sees the tomato, and in the latter two situations they see only a part.
The lack of detail concerning psychological mechanisms and the 
sketchiness of what Clarke has to say about matters semantic and 
15 One might look to the work of Daniel Dennett, and in particular (Den-
nett 1991) for an example of a position which treats experience and con-
sciousness as indeterminate. Dennett like Davidson is wary of privileging 
a first person perspective. Many of his critics interpret his position in this 
book as endorsing a form of anti-realism about sense experience and con-
sciousness. It is more difficult to force such an interpretation on Clarke’s 
discussion.
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pragmatic might incline the reader to dismiss the discussion of ‘See-
ing Surfaces and Physical Objects’ as just a philosophical trifle. And 
this reaction is surely reinforced by the lack of concern on Clarke’s 
part when he recommends such a radical conclusion as the kind of 
indeterminacy about experiential facts in particular, and perhaps 
psychological facts in general. But that would be to miss the main 
lessons of Clarke’s discussion which we can learn whatever our final 
verdict on his conclusions.
The core of Clarke’s discussion is the initial puzzle with which he 
closes the first half of his paper. Clarke assumes a view of first person 
knowledge of sense experience as shallow: that experience is express-
ible by the subject him or herself in reporting what things he or she 
sees. As we saw, this picture is quite in keeping with what Moore had 
to say about knowledge of experience and even also what Strawson 
much later had to say on the matter, from a very different perspec-
tive. But this shallowness of introspective knowledge predicts the 
utter obviousness of the matters which are under discussion. Only 
in situations where someone just can’t identify what they can see 
is there room for any genuine discovery here. And Clarke’s puzzle 
arises once we recognize with him that the Surface Enquiry cannot 
be trivial in quite that way. However much we find Clarke’s eventual 
conclusion implausible and under-developed, it seems a fairly direct 
response to the difficulty he has highlighted.
In turn, that might suggest that Clarke’s argument is needed more 
by the philosophical opponent who wishes to restrict our sight just 
to the façades of things, than by someone who follows Austin, and 
obdurately insists on the role of ordinary objects. Someone who 
wishes to stick with Austin’s conclusion, but not quite his dismissive 
attitude, can simply insist that in ST, STm and (a) one just sees the 
tomato, and that contrasts with one’s seeing just the surface in (b). 
No matter how one reflects on the situation, this remains stolidly the 
case. The argument rehearsed in favour of surfaces as immediate ob-
jects of sight fails because one of its assumptions is false, namely that 
we experience the scene in just the same way across (b) and the other 
three situations. All that is true is that we cannot tell that how we ex-
perience the scene in (b) is different from how we experience it in the 
other cases. But given that there is such a difference (different objects 
play analogous roles), there is no explanatory competition to be had 
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between the ordinary objects and the surfaces; so the argument fails. 
On the other hand, given the indistinguishability of the situations 
from the subject’s perspective, it is perfectly intelligible how Moore 
and the surface champions have come to be confused about what 
they can see, and so come to be led to misdescribe ST, STm and (a). 
Clarke’s own observation that endorsing Moore’s claim involves a 
non-trivial move from our starting point gives us reason nonetheless 
to reject that description of the situation. Such a response to Clarke’s 
arguments is sympathetic to Clarke’s perspective, but it holds off 
from affirming the indeterminacy of sense experience; it settles with 
the weaker proposal that we can find just a perfectly intelligible mis-
take in the opponent’s position.
In contrast, someone who positively wishes us to endorse the Slim-
ming Assumption and end up with Moore’s stance on surface percep-
tion would seem to have to make use of something like Clarke’s take 
on the situation. If we have to grant that there is a shallowness to 
our sense experience of the world, and that our knowledge of it just 
derives from our knowledge of which things we see, then it is difficult 
to resist Clarke’s second step. Given that, we need some explanation 
of how people could be so mistaken about their visual experience 
of the tomato in the first place. Clarke’s shiftiness gives us a salient 
such explanation: the reflection we engage in simply alters our sense 
experience and makes the description the surface champion favours 
the correct description of the way one finds oneself to be.
Of course, as Clarke points out, accepting the shiftiness of sense 
experience in this manner undermines the project of establishing a 
general truth about sense experience. So we might draw a general 
moral here so. To the extent that one is inclined to reject the idea that 
our sense experience is indeterminate in the strange ways Clarke ex-
plores, to that extent one has additional reason to endorse the kind 
of obdurate resistance to the view that we immediately see only sur-
faces and not ordinary objects. The moment one supposes along with 
Clarke that there is something right about Moore’s insistence that 
strictly speaking it is only the facing surface of his hand that would 
be a candidate to be a sense-datum, then one has to acknowledge 
that sense experience is the kind of thing where thinking it one way 
rather than another makes for it being one way rather than another. 
Clarke offers his account of unit concepts as a way of defusing the 
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sceptical thrust of the Surface Enquiry. But his discussion equally 
shows that one can only endorse the claim that in some sense we 
are only aware of surfaces if we also endorse his picture of shifting 
experience. If one is resistant to that account of experience, then one 
should resist the first step. Either way, then, we should reject what 
Moore and Jackson take to be obvious truths about seeing and visual 
experience.
12.  What then of our original questions: the significance of the 
direct/indirect distinction, and the relation between the traditional 
problem of perception and the disputes we find in contemporary dis-
cussion? We saw that a coherent structure for the direct/indirect, or 
immediate/mediate, distinction as applied to vision is furnished by 
Jackson’s proposal that we think of immediate seeing as at the bot-
tom of a hierarchy, distinguished from mediate seeing through the 
added complexity of the latter: in mediate seeing one sees an object 
in virtue of seeing something distinct from it. But where Jackson 
takes the notion of immediate seeing as entirely primitive and with-
out further explanation, we have instead argued that one can only 
justify application of this hierarchy by appeal to distinctive connota-
tions of direct or immediate seeing.
The core idea that we applied in this case is the role that the im-
mediate objects of sight play in constituting the overall look of the 
scene one currently sees. This is in harmony with the first personal 
aspect in the sense-datum enquiry; each perceiver is uniquely placed 
to identify the candidates which play the sense-datum role in his or 
her own case. So we have reason to accept that at best surfaces are 
directly seen and not opaque objects, if we can show that at best 
surfaces (among environmental objects) fix the look of the scene one 
currently sees, and the opaque objects whose surfaces these are drop 
out of playing that role. In that case, surfaces are directly seen, and 
opaque objects are only indirectly seen. (In turn, as far as Moore is 
concerned, some suitable further considerations such as the argu-
ment from illusion might show that not even the surface can play 
that role in one’s experience, but that it must rather be occupied by 
some non-physical entity.)
Clarke’s discussion brings out how difficult it is to reason to the 
conclusion that we do only immediately see surfaces (or at best, see 
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surfaces), given a starting point where we identify the objects we can 
currently see. The shallowness of our sense experience – that there is 
nothing more to what we know of our sense experience other than 
what we can report in terms of what we see – seems to undermine the 
kind of reasoning in play with the Slimming Assumption we intro-
duced above. Either the role of surfaces is just obvious to us and no 
such reasoning is required, or the reasoning in question does some-
thing different from what it advertises: it changes our experience so 
that we are only aware of the surfaces as long as we are in the grip 
of these reflections.
But the morals we learned from Clarke’s discussion shouldn’t lead 
us to reject wholesale this picture of direct seeing. Someone who em-
braces Clarke’s ultimate conclusion, in its teasing, allusive and puz-
zling form, will reject the idea that we only directly see the surfaces of 
opaque objects. Such a person won’t deny that we can make ourselves 
be such as only to perceive the surfaces, but when our attention to 
the question fades, ordinary objects flood back into our experience. 
Such a person has no particular use for the idea of indirect objects of 
sight. The Slimming Assumption doesn’t establish that when we see 
only surfaces, we also still count as seeing the objects whose surfaces 
these are. And when we are not engaged in Clarke’s Surface Enquiry, 
the look of the scene for us is determined by the ordinary objects 
there, so they count as direct objects of sight in such circumstances. 
Acknowledging a role for the category of indirect object requires 
equivocating between these two contexts, as Clarke himself charged. 
This conclusion holds too for someone who endorses the more obdu-
rate response to Clarke’s discussion, and holds on to the idea that it 
is the object itself we directly see. On such a view, one may have no 
application for the category of indirect seeing, insisting that the only 
reason one has to suppose an object is seen is that it figure within the 
scene as it strikes one. But such a reaction needn’t lead one to reject 
the coherence of the distinction between direct and indirect percep-
tion, and hence the connotations of direct perception. To reject the 
claim that ordinary objects are only indirectly seen, is not thereby 
to suppose that we can make no significant sense of the claim, it is 
simply to find it unproven and indeed false.
Austin is wrong to reject the terms of the traditional debate. We 
can apply a relevant determinate sense to the debate over direct ver-
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sus indirect objects of perception; and so we can understand the sig-
nificance of the choice over direct realism versus indirect realism. But 
even if the original debate is coherent, is it still a live issue? And is it 
to be found in new garb within recent discussions of experience and 
content, or have recent debates shifted the focus of concern? Can we 
find the concerns of these older concerns within contemporary dis-
putes about sense experience, intentional content and phenomenal 
qualities? 
Moore and Clarke conceive of the objects of sight or awareness 
as concrete individuals which can exhibit sensible qualities. Discus-
sion of intentional or representational content typically focuses on 
an analogy with what an indicative sentence can express, a proposi-
tional content, or what we can believe or judge to be the case. Most 
such theorists conceive of intentional contents as abstract entities, 
even if they have concrete constituents. So at first sight, a shift of 
discussion from objects of perception to contents of perceptual expe-
rience is a shift of focus from one topic to another.
Moreover, from Russell’s first advertisement of the sense-datum 
account of sensory awareness, the commitment to there always being 
actually existing objects of awareness has been treated as extremely 
controversial. It is commonly seen as a problematic feature of sense-
datum theories that they posit the existence of non-physical objects 
of sense, and this unwelcome consequence is taken to be sympto-
matic of failings in the reasoning which leads sense-datum theorists 
to their commitments in the first place. By contrast, a commitment 
to representational aspects of sense experience is typically taken to 
be no more controversial in what it introduces as the furniture of the 
mind than the representational aspects we must already acknowl-
edge in respect of thought and judgement. So, even if Austin’s own 
arguments are not ultimately compelling, one might think that the 
terms and commitments of the sense-datum approach have been ap-
propriately left behind.
But our discussion of the Surface Enquiry suggests there is a sig-
nificant continuity between the two sets of discussion after all. In 
unpacking the connotations associated with direct perception, we 
saw how Moore conceived of visual experience as that of which the 
subject has knowledge through suitable attention to the immediate 
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objects of awareness and their manifest qualities. Moreover, we saw 
that this picture of how one comes to know about sense experience 
is echoed in Strawson’s exchange with Ayer. Strawson clearly rejects 
Moore’s ontological commitments. Moore throughout the fifty years 
he published papers on sense perception never once took seriously 
the idea that sense experience might fail to have an existing object 
of awareness. Strawson frames his discussion of sense experience 
against the background assumption that it is possible that one should 
experience in just this way, even if the objects one takes oneself to 
be perceiving do not exist. Despite this sharp contrast in ontological 
commitment, however, they agree on the picture of how we know 
about our sense experience. And this common assumption is at least 
as important as the contrast in ontological commitment.
Moore’s account lends itself to a notion of content of experience 
removed from talk of propositions and truth values. As we have seen, 
the key thing that direct objects of visual perception do is jointly fix 
the overall look of a scene to a subject. When we shift our focus from 
the objects to the sense experience, it is tempting to think of the ex-
perience as a kind of bubble or bucket, scooping up these objects for 
the subject. So conceived experience is a container, and its content, or 
rather contents, are the objects of sensory awareness.
Although Strawson rejects Moore’s ontological commitment, this 
picture of sense experience as a container is one that he should con-
cede makes sense from the subject’s point of view. After all, there 
need be nothing about the visual experience which keys the subject 
in to the non-existence of the objects he or she seems to see. So, just 
as Strawson’s suggested description reports, it is for the subject as if 
this and that object together make up the scene which comprises the 
way the subject experiences.
As noted above, Strawson is not explicitly a proponent of an in-
tentional theory of perception, although there are aspects of his dis-
cussion which hint at some such commitment. But the combination 
of rejecting the ontological commitments of the sense-datum theory 
while affirming the above sketched picture of the subject’s knowl-
edge of experience is to be found among writers who explicitly take 
these elements to underline the intentionality of sense experience. 
Looking earlier than Strawson, we can find GEM Anscombe suggest-
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ing that we should recognize a contrast between the material objects 
of seeing and the intentional objects (Anscombe 1965). She insists we 
should not think of intentional objects as a distinctive kind of entity, 
but rather should acknowledge that a sentence such ‘Moore sees his 
hand’ can be true, even if no such hand exists. Shortly after Straw-
son’s paper, we can find John Searle insisting on the intentionality of 
visual experience in order both to avoid the commitment to sense-
data and to ensure immediate experiential contact with environmen-
tal objects (Searle 1983); in the same year, Christopher Peacocke in-
sists that there are representational properties as aspects of what it is 
like for us to have sense experience (Peacocke 1983). Although there 
are writers within the tradition who have posited a representational 
aspect to sense experience without thereby taking it to have any sig-
nificant connection with its subjectively knowable character, many 
contributors to recent debate seem to follow Anscombe, Strawson 
and Searle in taking there to be a connection between the intentional 
import of sense experience and what the subject can know of the 
experience through reflection.16
So we might put the commonality of the two approaches so. The 
traditional debate is a debate about which objects can be the direct 
objects of perception, and as we have seen, at root that is a debate 
about which objects can feature in our sense experience. The inten-
tional tradition can be seen as widening the terms of this debate: the 
question now is not only which objects can feature in our experience, 
but how they can so feature. The sense-datum tradition insists that 
we understand the idea that experience contains objects literally. So 
the only question for the traditional debate is which objects play this 
role. The intentional approach, on the other hand, questions the as-
sumption that what seems to the subject to be an object of awareness 
must actually exist. So even if we can make sense of objects as be-
ing contained within experience through the subject being aware of 
them, this cannot be the only way that objects belong in experience. 
The positing of intentional contents or representational properties is 
an appeal to some further explanatory condition: something which 
16 Most notably, DM Armstrong offers a belief theory of perception in 
order to avoid any appeal to a notion of awareness, see (Armstrong 1968). 
In recent discussion, Tyler Burge is most notable for arguing for the central-
ity of a notion of perceptual representation entirely independently of any 
concern with sensory consciousness, see (Burge 2010).
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explains why it is appropriate for the subject to describe his or her 
position in terms of these objects even if in fact they don’t actually 
exist. Rather than there being a sharp break from the traditional de-
bate, then, the intentional approach should be seen as simply broad-
ening the options available for understanding what can be the ob-
jects of awareness, and what facts can explain experience being so.
That we should think of these debates in terms of continuity is 
further reinforced when we notice that the typical concerns that in-
tentional theorists appeal to in order to make us recognize the inten-
tionality of sense perception are the kinds of concerns that moved 
sense-datum theorists at the beginning of the twentieth century: the 
puzzles of how to understand conflicting appearances or illusions, 
delusions and hallucinations. And this brings us back to a final moral 
that we can learn from Clarke. Austin is sceptical whether there is 
any substantive issue to be found in the debate about direct percep-
tion. Clarke emphatically disagrees. When one thinks through the 
two steps in the first half of Clarke’s paper, one seems to learn some-
thing surprising about one’s perceptual situation, something which 
might potentially threaten one’s understanding of how one knows 
there is a hand there, or an ink stand on the lectern. So Clarke’s 
resistance to Moore unpacks in a novel way the significance of the 
traditional debate: its significance lies in our making sense of some-
thing seemingly obvious to us, our experience of the world and what 
we know of that experience.
In turn, intentional theorists often promise that their positive ac-
counts of sense perception, in contrast to a sense-datum theory, can 
preserve direct realism about perception. Clarke shows us that to the 
extent that this is true, it will be significant if the intentional theory 
leaves unchallenged what we all can initially claim about our visual 
experience, or what we can see. The Surface Enquiry, and behind 
it the sense-datum theory, cannot avoid such revision. Certainly in-
tentional theorists such as Searle have the commitment we found in 
Strawson to identify the objects of experience as the ordinary envi-
ronmental objects we take ourselves to perceive. But in widening the 
debate about experience, by raising the question about the manner 
in which an object counts as falling within the bounds of experience, 
they introduce a further such test. Do the facts about sense experi-
ence which the intentional theorist acknowledges really flow from 
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the attribution of intentional content or representational properties 
to sense experience? If not, then it is unclear how the intentionalist’s 
description of the situation can accord with our initial take on the 
situation, as found at the beginning of Moore’s discussion of sense-
data. And if such a theory came to be in conflict with our initial 
description, then we would face just the same puzzle that Clarke 
raises about the Surface Enquiry. Whether we use the epithet ‘direct 
realist’ for the view or not, it would be puzzling and objectionable in 
just the same way that what used to be called indirect realisms were. 
Whether intentional theories really do face this challenge turns ulti-
mately on the positive account that they offer (or rather currently fail 
to offer) of why it is correct for us to describe our experience in terms 
of the objects of perception given that experience has the intentional 
content it does.
In the end we can see first that the direct/indirect distinction is 
coherent and significant. Austin was wrong in his dismissal of it. 
Nonetheless, the utility of talking in these terms, of the objects of 
awareness rather than experience is removed once we give up the 
sense-datum theorist’s assumption that there always is an actual ob-
ject of awareness. No doubt that explains to a large extent the shift in 
terms between the traditional debate and recent discussion. The shift 
in terms does not remove the significance of the puzzle that Clarke 
highlights, though: the need that any theory focused on our sense 
experience and our knowledge of it, to accord with what should be 
obvious to us the moment we reflect upon it. 
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